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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.- .

.

.:

EDGAR TIEDEMANN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20080471-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(j) (2008). Appellant Edgar Tiedemann was convicted and sentenced for two
counts of murder, both first degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995),
and one count of attempted murder, a second degree felony under Utah Code Ann. §§ 765-203 and 76-4-101 (1995). The judgment is attached as Addendum A. (R. 937-39).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
A. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to strike a
veniremember for cause.
Standard of Review: Dismissing a prospective juror for cause is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. "When reviewing such a ruling, we reverse only if the trial
court has abused its discretion." State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991); accord, State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 343-44
(Utah 1993). The exercise of discretion must be viewed "cin light of the fact that it is a
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simple matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror
and selecting another.'5' Woolley, 810 P.2d at 442 (quoting Jenkins v. Parrish. 627 P.2d
533, 536 (Utah 1981)).
Preservation: The issue was preserved in the record at 970:28-34.
B. Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence statements that
Tiedemann made in connection with a pre-Miranda interrogation conducted by police.
Standard of Review: This Court will review a trial court's determination about
custodial interrogations for correctness. See State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ^fl[ 4-5, 144 P.3d
1096 (stating that "the important policy of promoting uniformity" in police
administration of Miranda warnings "mandates greater appellate involvement").
Preservation: The issue was preserved in the record at 804-814 and 966:27-30.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions are set forth at Addendum B: Utah R. Crim. P. 18
(2008); U.S. Const, amends. V, VI, and XIV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below
In November 2002, the State charged Tiedemann with three counts of murder
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995), stemming from events that occurred in
November 1991. (R. 1-5). On October 6, 2003, the trial court bound Tiedemann over
for trial. (R. 99). In December 2004, Tiedemann filed a motion to suppress statements
made during a police interrogation in November 1991, and a motion to dismiss the
charges based on the State's destmction of evidence in 1993. (R. 246-267; 388-403; see.
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also R. 337-358). The trial court denied both motions. (R. 585-595; 599-607).
Tiedemann petitioned for interlocutory appeal (see e.g. R. 598, 608-610), and the
Utah Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the trial court's rulings in part and
remanded for further proceedings. (R. 659-683); see_ State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,
162 P.3d 1106. Thereafter, Tiedemann filed additional pre-trial motions in the trial court,
including a motion to suppress statements made to police when they asked questions
without first advising Tiedemann of his rights per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). (See R. 804-814). The trial court denied that motion in part. (See R. 865-66).
On February 21, 2008, the state filed an amended information for two counts of
murder, and one count of attempted murder. (R. 867-69). On February 22 and 25, 2008,
the trial court began trial proceedings with jury questionnaires and voir dire. (R. 879).
During those proceedings defense counsel made a for-cause challenge against Juror No.
19, Ms. English. (See R. 970:28-34). The trial court denied the challenge. (Id?)
On February 26, 2008, the trial court gave the jury instructions, and the parties
presented arguments and evidence. (See R. 888-89). The trial continued on February 27
and 28, and at the conclusion, the jury rendered a guilty verdict on each count as charged.
(R. 890-91; 895-96; 897-99). On May 2, 2008, the trial court sentenced Tiedemann to
consecutive prison terms, which may be for life, for each count of murder; and to a prison
term of one to fifteen years for attempted murder. (R. 937-39). On May 28, Tiedemann
filed a notice of appeal. (R. 947). The appeal is timely. See Utah R. App. P. 3 & 4
(2008). Tiedemann is incarcerated.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 2, 1991, Deborah Pryor called police to report that three people had
been shot at a West Valley trailer home (see R. 969:64-65), and she reported that the
suspect was at a nearby gas station. (See R. 969:145-46). As police approached the gas
station, they had emergency lights engaged and Deborah in the car. (R. 969:66, 128, 14546). Deborah pointed to Tiedemann as the suspect. (R. 969:66, 146). Officers got out of
their cars, shouted commands at Tiedemann, and drew their weapons. (R. 969: 139, 14647). Officer Stinson testified that when Tiedemann removed his hands from his pockets,
he had a gun in each hand. (R. 969:147-48). Stinson ordered Tiedemann to drop the
guns and to lie on the ground. (R. 969:147-48). He complied. (R. 969:135).
Stinson approached Tiedemann and handcuffed and "secured him." (R. 969:148).
He then straddled Tiedemann and asked "what was going on." (See R. 805-06).
Tiedemann responded that he "killed three people, Chuck, Susy [sic] and Scott." (Id.)
Stinson asked where the shootings had taken place, and Tiedemann gave an address in
West Valley City. (Id.) Officers then searched Tiedemann, and as they took him to the
car, he stated he "shot them because they had burned him on a drug buy of $6,000." (R.
806; 969:148). Also, he stated he had been "sniffing glue since he was a young boy."
(R. 806; 969:148). Officers later admonished Tiedemann per Miranda and interviewed
him a second time at the police station. See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ^ 2-3.
Prior to trial, Tiedemann asked the court to suppress pre-Miranda statements made
at the arrest scene. (See R. 804-814; 966:27-30). The trial court denied the request in
part. (R. 966:30). In February 2008, the case went to trial. (See R. 879).
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During jury selection, the defense asked the court to strike a potential juror, Ms.
English, after she revealed that she had worked at the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office
transporting in-custody inmates to court. (See R. 970:28-33). The defense maintained
that given Ms. English's background and experience - her knowledge of the policies and
procedures for in-custody inmates and her presumed knowledge of Tiedemann's incustody status at trial - she should be stricken for cause. (R. 970:32-33). Her knowledge
was inherently prejudicial to Tiedemann. It violated the presumption of innocence and
Tiedemann's rights to due process. (See id.) The trial judge denied Tiedemann's
challenge (R. 970:34), and Tiedemann was forced to cure the trial court error by using his
own peremptory strike on Ms. English. (See Jury List, attached to the inside flap of
volume 3 of the pleadings files).
After the trial court empanelled the jury, the State presented its evidence. Deborah
Pryor testified that on November 1, 1991, she, her husband Chuck, her sister Susie, and
her nephew Scotty stayed overnight with Tiedemann in his trailer home. (R. 969:29).
Sometime after dinner, they watched television then all went to bed. It was 12:00 or
12:30. (R. 969:34). Deborah smelled paint thinner in the trailer. (R. 969:34-35). She
testified Tiedemann was inhaling it. (R. 969:34).
Shortly after Deborah and her husband fell asleep in the spare room, she was
awakened by a loud noise. (R. 969:36-37 (stating she heard a loud pop)). Thereafter,
over the next few hours, she continued to lie in bed as Tiedemann paced back and forth in
the trailer and fired several shots, including four shots into the spare room. (R. 969:3743, 73). After a while, Tiedemann told Deborah to "get up. I know you are not dead."
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(R. 969:43). He was holding a gun. (R. 969:44). Deborah and Tiedemann went into the
living room (R. 969:45), and Tiedemann retrieved a second gun from his pants pocket.
(R. 969:54). Also, Tiedemann continued to inhale a lime-green substance from a glass
jar. (R. 969:48-50).
According to Deborah, Chuck was dead (R. 969:40); Scotty was conscious, but
bleeding and paralyzed (R. 969:46-47, 75); and Susie was covered with a blanket. (R.
969:50). Tiedemann pulled the blanket down and Deborah could see that she had been
shot in the right eye. (R. 969:51).
Deborah was able to leave the trailer later that morning when she told Tiedemann
she knew where to get cocaine. (R. 969:55). Together they drove to a convenience store
and gas station while Deborah purportedly made telephone calls about drugs. (R. 969:5661). After making calls at the gas station, Deborah left Tiedemann and drove to the home
of acquaintances, Pat and Tony. (R. 969:61-63). When she reached their home, she ran
inside and told them to call 911. (R. 969:63-65, 111). Pat gave the phone to Deborah
and she reported the shootings. (R. 969:64-65). Police arrived shortly thereafter and
transported Deborah to the gas station to identify Tiedemann. (R. 969:65-66).
The State also presented evidence from officers and agents who investigated the
trailer and Tiedemann. Specifically, officers testified that they went to the trailer and
forced their way inside. (R. 969:97-98, 175-77). They dispatched medical personnel for
Scotty, who was still conscious (R. 969:99, 101-02, 105, 161-62), and they confirmed
that Chuck and Susie were dead. (R. 969:99-100). Officers investigated and recorded
the scene (R. 971:12-15, 61-66). Also, they interviewed Tiedemann and Deborah at the
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police station. (R. 971:66-77). After the interrogations, they returned to the trailer to
assess the scene in light of Tiedemaim's confessions (R. 971:77-79), and to collect
evidence (R. 971:65-66) that was later destroyed. See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, \\ 8-9.
In addition, medical examiner Maureen Frikke testified that she investigated the
scene and conducted autopsies on Susie and Chuck. (See R. 971:21-25). According to
Frikke, Susie suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the head. (R. 971:23-25, 26). And
Chuck suffered three gunshot wounds, including a fatal shot to the chest. (R. 971:28-30,
32). A second medical examiner, Edward Leis, testified to the injuries that Scotty
suffered in November 1991, including a gunshot wound to the right eye and at least two
gunshot wounds to the chest. (R. 971:42-43).
After the State presented its case, Tiedemann testified. (See R. 972:6). He
acknowledged that after Susie, Scotty, Chuck and Deborah arrived at his home on
November 1, 1991, he went to his room to "sniff[]" paint remover and he continued to
"sniff[]" it throughout the evening to get "high." (R. 972:8-9). He testified that he was
awakened in the night when he heard arguing and a loud noise. (R. 972:10 (stating the
noise was gunfire)). He got up and encountered Deborah "running down the hall." (R.
972:11). She "lobbed" a gun at him and told him to "[l]oad it up." (R. 972:11). He
complied. (R. 972:12). He then handed the loaded gun to Deborah and picked up a
"long-barrel .22 out of the ammunition box." (R. 972:12-13).
As Tiedemann walked down the hall, he passed the spare room and saw Chuck
covered in blood. (R. 972:13). He went to Susie, and saw no visible signs of life. (R.
972:13-15). Also, Scotty was covered in blood. (R. 972:14). As Tiedemann stepped
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over Scotty, he asked, "why did you shoot me?" (Id.) Tiedemann was horrified. (Id.)
He walked back down the hall to Deborah and asked "Why did you do this?" (R.
972:15-16). Deborah said nothing. (R. 972:16). At some point, Deborah and Tiedemann
decided to leave; he wanted cocaine and she wanted heroin. (R. 972:19). Also,
Tiedemann wanted to get help for Scotty. (R. 972:19). Tiedemann described driving to
make phone calls (R. 972:19-26), meeting a dealer for heroin in a park (R. 972:23, 2425), waiting at the gas station while Deborah went for cocaine and the authorities to help
Scotty (see R. 972:26-28), and the police encounter at the gas station. (R. 972:28-29).
Tiedemann acknowledged that he made confessions to the police. (R. 972:29-35).
He acknowledged a history of inhaling toxic substances (R. 972:35-37; see also R.
972:43-44 (acknowledging that inhaling substances would probably cause brain
damage)); he acknowledged spending time at the hospital recovering from a stroke (R.
972:37-39); and he talked about his sexual relationship with Susie (R. 972:40-41). He
testified that he did not shoot Susie, Chuck or Scotty, but he made confessions to police
because he "wanted to die." (R. 972:42).
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Tiedemann guilty as charged.
(R. 972:77-79).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
For the first issue, the defense asked the trial court to remove Juror No. 19, Ms.
English, from the jury for cause on the grounds that her employment with the Salt Lake
County Sheriffs Office and her involvement in and knowledge of transporting in-custody
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inmates denied Tiedemann his rights under the Due Process Clause. Based on Ms.
English's personal experiences she would know that Tiedemann was in-custody thereby
undermining the presumption of innocence. Although the trial court had enough veniremembers to seat an unbiased jury, it rejected Tiedemann's challenge and required him to
exercise one of his peremptory strikes to remove Ms. English from the panel. The trial
court's ruling was in error. Tiedemann suffered prejudice: He was denied a substantial
right in that he was not allowed the same number of peremptory strikes to use on
prospective jurors as the prosecutor, because he was required to cure trial court error with
use of his peremptory strike on Ms. English. Tiedemann respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court ruling and remand the case for a new trial.
For the second issue, the trial court erred when it denied a motion to suppress
statements made by Tiedemann in connection with a pre-Miranda interrogation.
Specifically, officers engaged in questioning designed to elicit incriminating statements
without first giving Tiedemann the opportunity to invoke or waive his rights per Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Officers expressly interrogated Tiedemann at the scene
of the arrest while Tiedemann was in police custody, handcuffed and held at gunpoint.
The officers knew or should have known that the questions were likely to elicit
incriminating statements. Thus, Tiedemann's statements were coerced. The statements
should have been suppressed. Tiedemann asks this Court to reverse the trial court's
ruling and to remand the case for a new trial.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
TIEDEMANN'S CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE WITH RESPECT TO JUROR
NO. 19, MS. ENGLISH.
A. A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO BE TRIED BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY.
IN ADDITION, A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A FAIR TRIAL AND THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
1. The Impartial Jury,
The state and federal constitutions provide that a defendant is entitled to a trial by
an impartial jury. U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12. In support of that
right, parties participate in voir dire where they are given the opportunity to question a
potential juror to determine whether he or she has any prejudice or bias that may interfere
with that juror's ability to decide evidentiary issues "fairly and objectively" or to apply
"objectively the rules of law given to the jury by the trial judge." State v. Saunders, 1999
UT 59, Tf 44, 992 P.2d 951. Ultimately, the trial court is responsible for safeguarding the
defendant's right to an impartial jury. See State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); see also State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318, 319 (Utah 1977) (stating it is the duty
of the trial court to see that the constitutional right to an impartial jury is safeguarded).
When a prospective juror's statements in voir dire raise a question of bias, a
challenge for cause may be made pursuant to Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
A trial court has discretion in granting a challenge for cause. Woolley, 810 P.2d at 442.
However, the exercise of discretion "must be viewed 'in light of the fact that it is a simple
matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and
selecting another.'" IcL (quoting Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536); Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^ 51
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(recognizing the ease with which an issue of bias "can be dispensed by the simple
expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another whose neutrality is not open to
question"); see also State v. McCoy ey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (recognizing
that an abuse of discretion results when the trial court fails to properly consider the law);
State v. JoliveU 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986) (stating discretion is within the limits
prescribed by the law).
2. The Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial and the Presumption of Innocence.
Next, the defendant is entitled to the presumption of innocence and to a fair trial.
See U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (ensuring due process); Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7, 12
(identifying guaranteed rights). He is entitled to have a jury determine his guilt or
innocence based solely on the evidence and not on circumstances "not adduced as proof
at trial." State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, \ 20, 40 P.3d 611 (citation omitted). In that
regard, a defendant is entitled to the "physical indicia of innocence" at trial. Kennedy v.
CardwelL 487 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1973), cert, denied. 416 U.S. 959 (1974). The
indicia of innocence include the right of a criminal defendant to be tried in front of a jury
in the "garb of innocence," rather than in prison clothing. See Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d
341, 344 (Utah 1980) (stating that the "prejudicial effect that flows from a defendant's
appearing before a jury in identifiable prison garb is not measurable, and it is so
potentially prejudicial as to create a substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in a
criminal trial"). In addition, a defendant is entitled to be tried without being "shackled,
chained, bound, handcuffed, gagged, or otherwise physically restrained." State v.
Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing numerous cases supporting a
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defendant's right not to have the jury exposed to security measures directed at him).
Likewise, the defendant may not be judged based on his "custody" status. See
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (stating that a defendant is entitled to have
"his guilt or innocence determined solely" on the evidence and "not on grounds of
official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as
proof at trial") (citation omitted). In Holbrook, the United States Supreme Court
considered a trial court's use of several uniformed officers during defendants' trial. The
defendants maintained that the presence of the officers suggested to the jury that the
defendants were of "bad character." IcL at 563. Based on the circumstances of the case,
the Supreme Court disagreed. It stated that generally a jury would not conclude from the
presence of officers that a defendant is dangerous or culpable. IcL at 569. Indeed, jurors
may draw a number of inferences - unrelated to the defendant - as to why officers are
present. IcL (stating jurors may believe that officers are there to guard against courtroom
disruptions or tense exchanges). The Court refused to adopt a presumption that the "use
of identifiable security guards in the courtroom is inherently prejudicial." IcL Instead, it
preferred a "case-by-case approach" to the matter. IcL
Also, it indicated that under certain circumstances the presence of uniformed
officers may create an impermissible factor at trial: for example, if jurors are aware that
courtroom security measures are directed at a defendant and his custody status, that may
be inherently prejudicial. See icL at 569, 570 (defining the question for review as whether
the action was "inherently prejudicial"). In that instance, the Court would assess whether
the courtroom conduct presented "an unacceptable risk" of an impermissible factor at
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trial. Id. at 570 (citation omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has applied the Holbrook standard. In State v. Daniels,
it ruled that "when a courtroom action or arrangement is challenged as inherently
prejudicial, we consider whether the practice presents an unacceptable risk of bringing
into play impermissible factors that might erode the presumption of innocence."
2002 UT 2, f 20 (citations omitted). Also, the court considers "whether the prejudicial
practice is outweighed by any competing essential state interests." LL
B. SINCE JUROR ENGLISH KNEW POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ABOUT
IN-CUSTODY SUSPECTS AT TRIAL, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
STRICKEN HER FROM THE PANEL FOR CAUSE.
1. If a Juror's Answers Indicate Bias, the Juror May Be Stricken for Cause.
In considering whether a trial court should have stricken a prospective juror for
cause, an appellate court will apply a two-part test: first, the court will decide "whether
the trial court committed legal error" when it failed to strike the prospective juror; and
second, it will decide "whether the trial court's failure to strike the prospective juror[]
prejudiced [the defendant]." See State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, \ 24, 24 P.3d 948. For the
first part of the analysis, Rule 18 states that a challenge for cause "may be taken" when a
juror has demonstrated "[cjonduct, responses, [a] state of mind or other circumstances
that reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially." Utah
R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14). Under that provision, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that
questions of bias arise when a juror reveals information indicating strong or deep
impressions, "which will close the mind against the testimony that may be offered" or
which will combat "testimony and resist its force." State v. Julian, 11X P.2d 1061, 1064-
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65 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted); State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 642 (Utah 1988) (stating
"strong and deep impressions" serve as a basis for disqualification) (citation omitted).
The rule considers each case based on the circumstances.
In the following cases, Utah courts refused to disqualify a prospective juror simply
because he or she had a career in law enforcement. These cases are distinguishable.
In State v. Cobb, 11A P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989), the defendant challenged the trial
court's failure to remove for cause a prospective juror who had served as a police officer
and had indicated that although he had made arrests, he believed he could be fair and
impartial. IcL at 1127. The prosecutor and defense counsel both asked several questions
of the prospective juror, and his answers "reflected] that he was willing to keep an open
mind and apply the law as the court instructed." Id_ Consequently, the court affirmed the
trial court's refusal to dismiss the juror for cause. Id. at 1127-28.
In State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court when it refused to remove a prospective juror who had served as an Army
officer and was responsible for drug and distribution investigations. Id. at 25-26. The
juror stated unequivocally that he would look at the case impartially. Thus the court
ruled that although a juror's statements of impartiality may lose their meaning in light of
other facts suggesting bias, in this case, "there [were] no additional facts in the record
that suggested] [the juror] had an impression so strong and deep as to constitute bias."
Id. at 26.
In State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah
1993), this Court considered whether a former highway patrol officer should have been
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dismissed for cause. IcL at 1222. In individualized questioning, the officer's statements
showed that he would not close his mind against the evidence in the case. IcL at 1223.
The trial court had asked several "careful" questions and uncovered no bias. M Thus,
any inference of bias had been rebutted and the trial court had not abused its discretion in
failing to remove the juror. IcL_\ see also State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 151-53 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (ruling that prospective juror's prior employment as a police dispatcher did
not justify striking him for cause).
The above cases support that notwithstanding the individual's experience in law
enforcement, he or she could remain impartial as a juror in a criminal trial. Cobb, 714
P.2d at 1127; Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25-26; Gray, 851 P.2d at 1222-23. However, if a
juror's responses in voir dire raise an inference of bias, the trial court must remove the
juror or ask additional questions in an effort to rebut the inference. See West v. Holley,
2004 UT 97, f 14, 103 P.3d 708; State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, \ 49, 55 P.3d 573;
Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 27 (citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988)); see also
Salt Lake City v. Tuero, 745 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing the trial
court made "significant efforts" to determine if potential juror could be unbiased).
In addition, if the trial court asks follow-up questions and the prospective juror
makes conclusory statements about her ability to decide the case fairly, those statements
may not be sufficient to overcome the inference. See Calliham, 2002 UT 86, Tf 49
(stating a potential juror's subsequent statement "that she can be impartial will not of
itself attenuate an inference of bias" arising from earlier statements); Wach, 2001 UT 35,
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K 33 (stating "[i]t is not enough if a juror believes that he or she can be impartial and
fair"); Woolley, 810 P.2d at 445 (stating an inference of bias generally is not rebutted "by
a subsequent general statement" that the juror "can be fair and impartial").
Likewise, a prospective juror's ambiguous or equivocal responses are not sufficient to rebut the inference. See Calliham, 2002 UT 86, Tf 51 (stating juror's ambiguous
and contradictory statements were "insufficient to rebut the inference of bias"); see also
Utah R. Crim. P. 18 (Advisory Committee Note) (stating, "[ajlthough thorough
questioning of a juror to determine the existence, nature and extent of a bias is
appropriate, it is not the judged duty to extract the 'right' answer from or to 'rehabilitate'
a juror"). If a prospective juror provides conflicting or equivocal responses, she should
be excused from the panel. See, e.g., Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^f 51.
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that trial courts should be liberal in
granting for-cause challenges where prospective jurors have demonstrated an actual or
perceived bias. It has stated that "trial judges should err on the side of caution in ruling
on for-cause challenges and that the scope of judicial discretion accorded a trial judge
must be evaluated in light of the ease with which all issues of bias can be dispensed by
the simple expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another whose neutrality is
not open to question." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 51 (citing Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536);
State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 510 (Utah 1997) (stating, "We acknowledge and agree with
the concurring and dissenting opinions in encouraging trial judges to heed the direction
that we have already given them to grant for-cause challenges when bias is shown")
(citing State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 649-50 (Utah), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 858 (1995));
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Woolley, 810 P.2d at 442 (recognizing it is a simple matter to obviate a problem of bias
by excusing the prospective juror and selecting another) (citation omitted); Depew v.
Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, f 11, 71 P.3d 601 (recognizing a trial court's discretion in
failing to strike a prospective juror is "most broad" when questions to jurors have no link
to potential bias, it "narrows" when voir dire questions have a possible link to bias, and it
disappears when "questions go directly to the existence of an actual bias") (citation
omitted).
In this case, Juror No. 19, Ms. English, revealed information supporting an inference of bias. Even when the trial court asked follow-up questions, her answers failed
to rebut the inference. Juror English should have been stricken from the panel for cause.
2. Ms. English Disclosed Information During Voir Dire that Specifically
Interfered with Tiedemann 's Right to the Presumption of Innocence.
In considering whether a trial court should have removed a veniremember for
cause, this Court will "look to the entire voir dire exchange" relating to that prospective
juror. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^ 47 (citing State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ^ 58, 20 P.3d
342). In this case, prospective Juror No. 19, Ms. English, disclosed during voir dire that
she worked with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office for 20 years. (R. 970:28-30; see
also Envelope entitled "Jury Questionnaires," Juror/Questionnaire No. 19). She worked
in the jail and as a transportation officer "bringing inmates to court" until 1989, and then
at that point, she became a court liaison officer until she retired from the sheriffs office
in 1995. (See R. 970:28-30). Her duties included guarding inmates in the court holding
cells, transporting them to and from the underground facilities "in the old court building",
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and sitting "in on the court hearings" and a couple of trials. (R. 970:28-29). Ms. English
did not "get any of the high-profile" cases. (R. 970:29). Also, she was familiar with
policies and procedures for transporting defendants. (R. 970:29).
Ms. English's 62-year-old husband also worked with the sheriffs office before
retirement, and they both worked with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (R.
970:28). Ms. English was familiar with an agent at Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association due her employment with the sheriffs office. (R. 970:29 (stating she knew
Joey Finnochio)). She believed her work with the sheriffs office would influence the
way she evaluated evidence. She stated, "I think it would [influence me] because of the
fact that I wouldn't be in awe of it as much as I would if I [had] been a civilian." (R.
970:28). Also, she stated, "I would be able to evaluate [the evidence] more clearly." (R.
970:29). Stated another way, Ms. English believed that due to her training as an officer,
she was in a better position to assess and weigh evidence for the truth.
The defense moved to strike Ms. English for cause due to her past association with
the sheriffs office and her personal information and knowledge concerning
transportation policies and courtroom conduct for in-custody inmates. (R. 970:32-33; see
also, e.g., supra pp. 11-13, herein). Since such information was specifically known to a
juror, it would constitute an inherently prejudicial and impermissible factor at trial. See
Daniels, 2002 UT 2, ^J 20, 23-24 (recognizing that courtroom practices aimed at the
defendant but not necessarily known to a juror may not be inherently prejudicial; also
recognizing that certain conditions in the courtroom may create an impression in the
minds of jurors about defendant's in-custody status); see also Holbrooke 475 U.S. at 569
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(refusing to presume that use of identifiable security guards in the courtroom is inherently
prejudicial, but acknowledging that juror awareness of security measures aimed at the
defendant may create prejudice). Also, such a factor would violate due process and erode
the presumption of innocence. (R. 970:32-33); see Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 567 (stating
that central to the right to a fair trial is the right to have guilt or innocence determined on
the basis of the evidence and not "on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued
custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial").
The prosecutor opposed striking Ms. English because jurors "shouldn't be
surprised]" that "a defendant charged with more than a count of murder would be under
supervision of bailiffs." (R. 970:32). After argument on the matter, the trial court denied
the request to strike Ms. English (R. 970:34), even though striking her would have been a
simple and straightforward remedy. See, e.g., State v. King, 2006 UT 3, If 17, 131 P.3d
202 (recognizing the ease with which an allegation of juror bias may be remedied);
Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^ 49; Baker, 935 P.2d at 510 (stating, "We acknowledge and
agree with the concurring and dissenting opinions in encouraging trial judges to heed the
direction that we have already given them to grant for-cause challenges when bias is
shown") (citation omitted); Woolley, 810 P.2d at 442 (stating it is a simple matter to
obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and selecting
another) (citation omitted); (see also R. 970:28-34, attached hereto as Addendum C).
Under the circumstances, the trial court's refusal to strike a juror - who had
personal information and knowledge about in-custody defendants — constituted an
unacceptable and unjustifiable risk on a defendant's due process rights. See, e.g., Daniels,
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2002 UT 2, Tf 20 (recognizing that when courtroom actions create an inherent prejudice,
the court will assess whether the actions present an unacceptable risk of impermissible
factors at trial, and it will assess the state interest for the actions); see also Saunders,
1999 UT 59, Tf 37 (recognizing that jurors may be "strongly influenced" by their "own
experiences and points of view and the possible biases" that arise from them); Utah R.
Crim. P. 18(e)(14) (stating a challenge for cause may be taken where a prospective juror
has disclosed circumstances that reasonably lead to the conclusion that she may not act
impartially); (Addendum D, identifying several other potential jurors for the panel).
In addition, in response to further questioning, Ms. English maintained that her
training as an officer would allow her to view and assess the evidence with more clarity
than "a civilian" jury member. (R. 970:28-29). That statement supports that Ms. English
would not be impartial in her approach to the evidence, but would give more credence to
an officer's ability to evaluate information for the truth. Those answers were insufficient
to rehabilitate her for impartiality. See, e.g., Calliham, 2002 UT 86, \ 51 (stating that
"ambiguous and contradictory statements were insufficient to rebut the inference of
bias"); Woolley, 810 P.2d at 445 (stating inference of bias generally is "not rebutted
simply by subsequent general statement" that the juror "can be fair and impartial").
Under the circumstances, Ms. English's personal knowledge was not only
inherently prejudicial to Tiedemann and his right to a fair trial {see supra. Argument
I.A.2., herein), but also, Ms. English indicated a preference for an officer's ability to
assess the facts and arrive at the truth. (See R. 970:28-29). Those circumstances leave a
strong impression about Ms. English and her inability to be impartial. See Utah R. Crim.
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P. 18(e)(14). The trial court should have excused Ms. English for cause. See_ id_ Since it
failed to remove her, it abused its discretion and acted beyond the limits of reasonability.
3. The Defense Was Forced to Remove Ms. English from the Panel with Use of a
Peremptory Challenge.
Because the trial court refused to strike Ms. English for cause (R. 970:34), defense
counsel was required to exercise a peremptory strike against her. (See Jury List, attached
to the inside flap of volume 3 of the pleadings files, and attached hereto as Addendum D).
Inasmuch as the peremptory strike was exercised in that fashion, the issue is properly
before this Court on appeal. Baker, 935 P.2d at 507 (recognizing that defendant's use of
a peremptory strike to remove a biased juror preserved the issue on appeal).
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT THE FOR-CAUSE
CHALLENGE CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.
In State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that
when a trial court has erred in failing to strike a prospective juror for cause, the defendant
must show prejudice. I<L at 400 (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a)); see also Utah R. Crim.
P. 30(a) (2008) (recognizing that error which does not affect "the substantial rights of a
party" shall be disregarded); Baker, 935 P.2d at 507 (stating defendant may be entitled to
reversal if he can show actual prejudice), l
Under the Menzies analysis, the defendant must show that he faced a "partial or
biased jury," or "the jury was made more likely to convict" as reflected in voir dire.
l The Menzies decision overruled Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975),
and its progeny, which allowed for automatic reversal in cases where a defendant was
required to use a peremptory strike to remove a veniremember that the trial court refused
to remove for cause. Id. at 1092.

21

Menzies, 889 P.2d at 400; Wach* 2001 UT 35, ^ 36 (stating the analysis focuses on the
empanelled jury). According to the court in State v. Wach, if the defendant lost the use of
a peremptory challenge because the trial court failed to remove a juror for cause, the
defendant would have to show that "as a result of the loss of his peremptory challenge he
was not able to remove another subsequently summoned juror who ultimately sat on the
jury, and who was c"partial or incompetent."'" Wach, 2001 UT 35, ^f 36 (citations
omitted). In addition, the defendant would have to show that he objected to that seated
juror. Id at 1ffi 38, 39.2
In this case, Tiedemann did not claim that jurors, who were empanelled, were
2 In Wach, the defendant maintained he was prejudiced because he intended to use his
peremptories on other veniremembers, who sat on the jury after he used the peremptory
strikes to cure trial court error. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ^j 37. The Utah Supreme Court
refused to consider that prejudice analysis because Wach did not specifically object to the
other veniremembers who sat on the jury. IcL at ^[ 38, 39. Yet under the law, a
defendant is not required to make on-the-record objections to jurors that he has planned
to remove with peremptory strikes. Indeed, the rule states that for a peremptory strike,
"no reason need be given" for removing a prospective juror. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(d)
(emphasis added).
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated: 'The essential nature of the
peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry
and without being subject to the court's control. While challenges for cause permit
rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of
partiality, the peremptory [challenge] permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality
that is less easily designated or demonstrable." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220
(1965) (emphasis added; internal citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Also, "[t]he value of peremptory challenges is
that they are intended and can be used when defense counsel cannot surmount the
standard for a cause challenge. Requiring the defendant to show actual bias - the standard
applicable to cause challenges - for the forced expenditure of a peremptory challenge
renders the separate statutory grant of peremptory challenges totally meaningless."
Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 100 (Fla. 2004).
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biased or incompetent. (See R. 970:46 (passing the jury "for cause")); see also Harding
v. Bell 2002 UT 108, \ 17, 57 P.3d 1093; WacK 2001 UT 35, \ 24. Nevertheless, he
maintains that the trial court's error in failing to strike Ms. English was prejudicial.
Specifically, under Utah law, a defendant is expected to cure trial court error by
expending his own peremptory strike - without compensation - against the challenged
juror (see State v. Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, ^ 7 n.l, 122 P.3d 895 (stating defendant
must cure trial court error with a peremptory strike)), while the prosecutor is allowed her
full quiver of peremptory strikes to use as she sees fit. Consequently, when the trial court
errs in failing to strike a juror for cause, its action impacts on the number of peremptory
strikes remaining for the defendant. That is, the defense has fewer peremptory strikes to
use than the prosecutor. That uneven allocation of a resource controlled exclusively by
the trial court results in harm. See Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 102 (Fla. 2004) (stating
"[t]he harm suffered by the defendant under such a scenario is having been forced to
accept a juror he or she would have peremptorily excused but for the need to remedy the
trial court's error"); Holtzrave v. Hoffman, 716 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D.
1986) (stating that a litigant is entitled to a "full panel of qualified jurors before making
peremptory challenges"); see also State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 291 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) (stating defendant failed to show prejudice when he argued that trial court error
resulted in an uneven allocation of peremptory challenges).
Tiedemann was deprived of the full number of peremptory strikes because he was
forced to use a strike to cure trial court error (see Jury List, Addendum D, hereto), while
the State was not required to use a peremptory strike in that fashion, but was free to shape
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the jury to its advantage. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(d) (allowing each side the same
number of peremptory challenges); Baker, 935 P.2d at 507 (recognizing defendant must
use available peremptory strike to remove biased juror).
That is a substantial deprivation. See e.g., Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); State v. Verde,
770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989) (defining the prejudice prong as error that is "of sufficient
magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party") (citations omitted); Carrier v.
Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 354-55 (Utah 1997) (recognizing that Menzies does
not address the situation where there has been a misallocation of peremptory challenges);
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (stating the peremptory challenge is "one of
the most important of the rights secured to the accused") (cite omitted), overruled on
other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Farias v. State, 540
So.2d 201, 203 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989) (stating "[i]t is error for a court to force a party to
exhaust his peremptory challenges on persons who should be excused for cause since it
has the effect of abridging the right to exercise peremptory challenges"); U.S. Const,
amend XIV, § 1 (ensuring due process of law).
Tiedemann's loss of a peremptory strike in this case prevented him from using the
strike on other jurors. For example, Juror No. 8, Don Dalling, was the victim of a
robbery and theft where someone broke into his home and stole his car. (See R. 970:1112; Envelope entitled "Jury Questionnaires," Juror/Questionnaire No. 8 at 4).
Under Utah law, that disclosure may not be sufficient to support a for-cause
challenge. See State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f 22, 153 P.3d 804 (stating "[t]he
simple fact that a potential juror may have ties to law enforcement does not establish

24

bias," and "[t]he same is true of a potential juror whose family member has been the
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The State's case here hinged on the credibility of an alleged victim, Deborah
Pryor. Yet Deborah's credibility was tarnished by her own history of drug abuse. (See
R. 969:78). When officers transported her to the station for a statement, they discovered
a makeup kit with heroin paraphernalia in her purse. (R. 969:89-90, 136-37). Even
though Deborah tried to claim that the makeup kit belonged to Tiedemann (R. 969:90,
136-37), evidence showed that it belonged to her, and she used it on the morning of the
shootings (R. 972:25), raising questions attrial about her integrity.
In addition, Deborah's statements implicating Tiedemann appeared to be selfserving. The record supports that when officers questioned Deborah about the shootings,
they repeatedly promised they would not pursue drug charges against her. (R. 971:8991). Under the law, when a person makes incriminating statements against another in an
attempt to curry favor with authorities, those statements "lack trustworthiness." State v.
Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Likewise, the record supports that Deborah was not forthcoming with officers in
her statements. For example, she left officers with the impression that when she left
Tiedemann at the gas station, she drove to a random house to report the shootings, and
the occupants there were strangers. (R. 969:155, 158). Yet other evidence supported that
Deborah knew the occupants, Pat and Tony (see R. 969:84-85); and they were drug suppliers. (See R. 969:116). In this case, the jury was advised that in judging witness credibility, it may consider "the apparent frankness or lack of frankness of the witness." (R.
905). In that regard, a witness who lacked frankness may not be believed. (See, e.g., id.)
Also, evidence supported that Deborah may have fired or handled the guns in the
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trailer on November 2, 1991. Specifically, agent Kevin Smith confirmed gun residue on
Tiedeniann,, i 'liu*. k, SUSK., .inJ Debo.\..: • .-•

• ^

Q

mith testified that a person

may be exposed to residue if, among other things In* «n iAic lur, lired a w cu\u w\ i H
handled it after it was fired. (R. 971:50, 57-58). In this case, Smith could not say where
tin* residue earn • livm

I ihiTl kmr.. A it came from the person who fired the weapon,

someone handling die weapon. 1 don't kiiuw ihe M miee

if'1 *'"'! ^ " i Slated another

way, gunshot residue evidence on Deborah suggested her involvement in the shootings.
]\ .-,•>.

-v LI;C Mate presented evidence that Tiedemann confessed to the

shootings, other evidence raised niu->i-.- *=

•

» •„;

he

confessions. (See, e.g., infra, Argument II., herein). Specifically, the defense cstah1.
A

sic:^ mie. , ie\\ ed [ icdemann for confessions while he was intoxicated.

971:83-84); Tiedemann. 2:»

-- *

.-\ :.»*

.

UL •:. . ». . iedemann was

"intoxicated at the time [of the interrogation] and [he] was later luui- '
to stand irhi

v

* >

; hcers acknowledged that under those circumstances, the statements

made rliinri ' (he iiifermwitini il times were erratic 11''. ' I ;H^-S /). Also, after the
officers interviewed Tiedemann, they returned to the trailer m srnnini 'e ibe scene to
match their conclusions to the intoxicated confessions. (R, 971:66-79). Officers and
agents tl len destn »\ \^\ ill the ph vsiee . \ .v-ence and were left only with their reports and
conclusions about the investigation for trial. See Tieclenhimu -:-' ?7 '

: : :

* ** ~ )-

In sum, the evidence raised doubts and concerns about Deborah's credibility and
integrity, ami (he circumstances surrounding Tiedemann's intoxicated confessions.
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Notwithstanding, the jury rendered its verdicts in less than four hours. (See, e.g., R.
972:76-77). In that regard, Dalling's experience as a victim of crime likely predisposed
him to Deborah's testimony and had an influence on the jurors for the results. This case
supports the determination that the trial court should have stricken prospective juror
English from the jury panel due to her personal knowledge and experience with criminal
defendants in legal proceedings. (See supra, Argument I.B., herein). If the trial court
had stricken English, Tiedemann would have been able to use his peremptory strike
against another juror, for example, Dalling who made disclosures raising questions of
bias. There is a reasonable likelihood that removing Dalling, a victim of crime, from the
panel would have tipped the balance in Tiedemann's favor. Since the court failed to
strike English, Tiedemann was forced to do so, and he was deprived of a substantial right.
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (stating that a peremptory challenge "is 'one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused'") (citation omitted). That supports prejudice for
a new trial. See Verde, 770 P.2d at 122 (defining prejudice prong as error "of sufficient
magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party") (citations omitted).
II. THE INTERROGATION AT THE SCENE OF THE ARREST WAS A
PER SE VIOLATION OF TIEDEMANN'S RIGHTS UNDER MIRANDA.
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." U.S. Const, amend. V. In order to
preserve that right, the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), established a series of warnings that officers must provide to a suspect before
engaging in an interrogation. IcL at 467-73 (stating a suspect must be advised that he has
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the right to remain silent, anything he says can be used against him, '•• - 1 - - :i= ";-L'

I

attorney, and an attorney will be provided if he cannot afford to retain one).
The Court recognized that if nffn vrs fail d- pnn ak warnings, any statement the
suspect makes in connection with an interrogation may not be used b\ *" "-•••••••

* 1.

fa al 444-4X 4 S- J(); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (stating "Miranda
safeguards come •

• •-

-. -

i

,

*-jected to either express

questioning or its functional equivalent"). Indeed, "an accused's pm-Miranda statin-, ^r-;
b^ ; : Guinea ;
Ustimenko

w.^ntarv due to the coercive nature of custodial interrogations." State v.

*

'

::mg Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.

298,305(1985)).
In considering whether a suspect's statements should have been suppressed for
lo i • *' Miranda wwv

..

-

a dements: first.whether the suspect was in

custody or deprived of his freedom in a significant * \

»• • - •

. • = • • - :. , .;• -

statements were elicited during officer interrogation. See, e.g., State v. Low, 2008 UT 58,
:

][ (•*'

. LA-}±a* ~ '• f

'

^ (recognizing that the analysis invoh ;> a

""

"custody" and an "interrogation" elenvM a >*ce also btaic v. A-Ju'Ljiici, e>~r i-.„u

• ;a ">7

(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating Miranda warnings are triggered by "custodial
•*••

-'I'IT.

;.

r"(^

.

.

^0); Layton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 12?'.

1214-15 (Utah A-p. 1091); Shite v. Sampson, so8 IJ U I I nil, I MM |( ''iah f 'I, , .j.),,
cert, denied, 817 v.ld 327 (I tah \ WW cert, denied* 117 L.Ed.2d 507 ^ t ) i p !

•' '

.-'cnuHi, ;^ person is in custody when '[the person's] freedom of action is curtailed
to a degree associated with h n'ni.il *

[^siLL,
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' • .ootnote and

citations omitted); see also State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 355 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(identifying factors for determining whether a person is in custody).
For the second element, "[interrogation is 'either express questioning or its
functional equivalent' and it incorporates any ' words or actions on the part of police
officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response.5" Low, 2008 UT 58, ^ 70 (citing, inter alia, Levin, 2006 UT 50, ^| 37); see also
Levin, 2006 UT 50, \ 34 (stating that "custodial interrogation consists of questioning or
use of other techniques of persuasion 'initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken inlo custody . . . ") (footnote and citations omitted); State v. Ferry, 2007
UT App 128, ^| 13, 163 P.3d 647 (stating interrogation refers to "express questioning" or
"its functional equivalent"). In that regard, follow-up statements and exclamations have
qualified as interrogation where the suspect is in custody. See, e.g., People v. Matthews,
70 Cal. Rptr. 756, 763-64 (Cal. App. 1968); Harrvman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 873 (5th
Cir. m0), cert, denied, 101 S.Ct. 161 (1980).
A. TIEDEMANN WAS IN CUSTODY WHEN OFFICERS CONDUCTED AN
INTERROGATION AT THE SCENE OF THE ARREST AND WITHOUT THE
BENEFIT OF MIRANDA WARNINGS.
Tiedemann made incriminating statements in this case on two separate occasions.
The first occasion was at the scene of the arrest (see R. 805-807), and the second
occasion was at the police station. See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, Tflf 48-56 (addressing
admissibility of statements made at the police station). This issue concerns statements
made on the first occasion, at the scene of the arrest.
According to the uncontested police reports, officers placed Tiedemann in
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significant restrictive custody to curtail his actions immediately upon encountering
(ACC K. VOO:~V

defense counsel represented - and the prosecutor did not dispute

the officers lacked an hii15 -

l.'m '** >i! - iw: ^ v' ^

-U it

. r« .:ie apprehension of

Tiedemann; thus, the parties relied on facts contained in police reports) K T!v.: • h.i

]

~

emergency lights engaged, they drew their weapons and trained them, on Tiedemann, they
surrounded m.

•' '

.

:. * • i

•<;-. see also K. Hi* : 46-48

(stating that officers immediately reacted upon encountering Tieden i < •n < K sec
Levin, 2(»« n- \

JISO

"-^ 36, 39 (recognizing four factors to support that a suspect is in

custo«l\ iiirliiding (he siU1 H (In; inteiTu^itliuit, whclhcr (he investigation was focused on
the accused, whether the objective indicia of arrest were prcscul, jm I (lv lenylh uiul I rui
of the interrogation; also recognizing that "indicia of arrest" include "handcuffs, drawn
weapon , 'lorkn I ilnnis tlnv.ns, m conuoii ) ( footnotes and citations omitted); U.S. v.
Miller, 722 F.Supp. 1, 5-6 (W.D.N.Y. 1 9 b * ' " ^ n - • 'i

• •''<>-' -

defendant was in custody). Officers then handcuffed and secured Tiedemann. (R. 805).
r

' :act> .i:^

i! • •. vii. .o support the first element of the analysis: Tiedemann was in

custody and he was "deprived oi V:

'^

<

.-. TIL ;n

^

Ynranda,

384 TT.S. at 444; Levin, 2006 UT 50,ffif36, 39 (identifying factors for "determining
w;'v-

•- : defen : i

:

n custody'").

Next, the analysis considers whether incriminating statements w ere "the product
of interrogation." Levin, 2006 UT 50, % 37. To that end, the question is "whet : - - vc viiicers ^li- *UK* .UI\ e known that their words or actions were likely to elicit an
incriniiik:-'^ n> • -••••

1

.

:;i,; s- vi.^uic.'i ;ne wwxis or actions
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themselves, their meaning, and their likely impact." Id.
According to the police reports, Officer Stinson stood above Tiedemann and he
asked "what was going on." (R. 805-06). Tiedemann responded that he "killed three
people, Chuck, [Susie], and Scott." (R. 806). Stinson asked where the shootings
occurred and Tiedemann gave an address in West Valley City. (R. 806). Tiedemann
then provided additional information, which Stinson relayed to police dispatch, and
officers searched Tiedemann. (R. 806). The encounter continued as follows:
At this point, Mr. Tiedemann also told the officers that he had heroin in his
pocket. Officer Stinson saw a small piece of plastic on the ground underneath
where Mr. Tiedemann had been and asked Mr. Tiedemann if that was the heroin.
Mr. Tiedemann responded that it was.
Officer Stinson then secured Mr. Tiedemann for transport to the station and
was walking Mr. Tiedemann to Officer Yurgelon's police cruiser when he stated
that "he had shot them because they had burned him on a drug buy of $6,000." He
also stated that he had been "sniffing glue since he was a young boy." Before
leaving, Officer Yurgelon again asked Mr. Tiedemann the address where the
shootings had taken place and he gave them the address again.
Sometime later, Mr. Tiedemann's hands were uncuffed for a Gun Shot
Residue test. At this point, Mr. Tiedemann told the police that he "had both guns
in my hands." He also said he "had the .22 over here" and shook his left hand and
that he had "the .38 over here" shaking his right hand."
(R. 806-07).
At a pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court ruled that some of
Tiedemann's pro-Miranda statements would be suppressed, and some statements would
be admissible in evidence at trial. (See R. 966:30, attached hereto as Addendum E).
Consequently, at trial, Stinson described approaching Tiedemann, giving him commands,
securing him and walking him to the police cruiser. (R. 969:146-48, 150). In addition,
when the prosecutor asked if Stinson asked Tiedemann any questions, he answered, "Not
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at that time, no/ 5 (R. 969:148; but see R. 969:152 (Stinson confirmed that he had to rely
<••.••:•

. . . , ,-,: . ;\ - ••- ' . < speciivmg iiiut use reports showed that Stinson

asked questions at the scene)). Stinson then testI fe\ :

•....,-

^ .• J. • ,

the police car, [Tiedemann"! stated that he had shot them because they had burned him on
a _*; ..^

'-

: iv

- ••'.£•/. : auii t;c u been sniffing glue since he was a young

boy. And all this was just spontaneous."

R '^v u v ) .

In this case, Officer Stinson opened the door to a custodial interrogation at the
::(

seen nfthr un

.v i UH »u( the benefit ol Miranda warnings. He engaged in conduct and

made statements that he "should have know«" w<

*

i :•

.....'L.M;;L

iiu^

om

Tiedemann. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ^ 37 (emphasis in original); (R. 805-06 (reflecting that
S• n«>-. Mi VV.-'L-UHJ;; ..inc nanuei tJ ICJ i iedemann while he was on the ground and then asked
"what was poir." ^r, "x • h e

•

^-.*. * . < > > . . • -

;:ig| tnree people";

also Stinson asked follow-up questions and Tiedemann made additional stater/v-v Specifically, Stinson initiated an illegal interrogation as he secured Tiedemann.
(R. 805-'-<*

i *i

• '

•

. J : . ... ^.nciied ] iedemann and

walked him to the patrol car as Tiedemann gave additional information 1 1 ia1 1 he < officer
noiL-a. \uL) bunion's words and actions constituted one continuous event that was
ii *

-- ' *•

'

•*.

>- ... -

\/IM, «' •' - -i • —;-;- K^pt the door of interroga-

tion open, prompting Tiedemann to make statements - about *!

dm* =t >L^ jr.

:, ,. lh g

"glue" (id.) - as part of the ongoing encounter. See_ Levin, 2006 UT 50, )\ 39 (stating the
an •! *- • *

e.

.\ .

• .^, actions, their meaning, and their likely impact).
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Tiedemann's statements that "he had shot them because they had burned him on a
drug buy of $6,000" and he had been "sniffing glue since he was a young boy" (R. 806;
969:148) are in direct response and relationship to Stinson's initial question, "what was
going on," and follow-up questions about where the shootings occurred. (R. 806).
Tiedemann's statements are pertinent only in the context of Stinson's questioning, as
demonstrated by the fact that the prosecutor elicited the statements from Stinson at trial
only after providing initial context about the shootings. (See R. 969:145 (reflecting
Stinton's testimony at trial that "three people had been killed and [] the person who had
done the shooting was" up the street)). Thus, the record supports the second element of
the analysis: incriminating statements were made in connection with the interrogation
without the benefit of Miranda warnings. See, e.g., Levin, 2006 UT 50,fflf34, 37
(recognizing the second element requiring Miranda warnings). The trial court erred in
admitting the statements into evidence at trial.
B. THE ERROR IN ADMITTING VKE-MIRANDA STATEMENTS AT TRIAL
WAS PREJUDICIAL.
An involuntary confession violates fundamental principles underlying the criminal
justice system, and results in constitutional error.
[Cjonvictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are
involuntary, Le^ the product of coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot
stand. This is so not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because
the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the
enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system - a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence
independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against
an accused out of his own mouth.
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (citations omitted); see also U.S.
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Const, amend XIV, § 1 (ensuring due process). The violation here warrants reversal
unless tl ic State can si IOW tl lat the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State
v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah l ^ . n ; , . .u-

•

••

*

JL: . ;nt

standard, the Court must determine "whether the State has met its burden of
demonstrating tl lat tl le adi: — .^i. wi iiu„, confession" "did not contribute to [the
defendant's] conviction." Arizona

v. h'ulminante,

4'W I I S 2'/[K 2()5-{){) \ i{){) I i

In other

words, the side which benefited by the error (the prosecution) must show beyond a
reasonable doubi dial (he error did not contribute to the verdict (or sentence) obtained."
State v. Young < *53 P. VI ?-

''!

"'

'

:

,l

-

-

. .>.

Also, for constitutional error, the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
A number of factors determine whether an error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, including "the importance of the witnesses] testimony in the prosecution's
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall
strength of the prosecution's case."
State v. VillarreaL vWv / ^. - •. - V - V ) (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). Tn ibis case, the
error in admittir; *'

• --Miranda ^:z---^ -• •!-

.•

^...-icv. °-,:>, prejudicial ioi the

following reasons.
First, evidence of a confession is powerful. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296
(statin*J "V**.1 /<M

-^U.'

*> •

\ »..

".wessons have [a] profound

impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt 11 In • H I r\" ^ I i h i I i I \ I | n 11
them out of mind even if told to do so." IcL (citation omitted).
[A full confession] may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching
its decision. In the case of a coerced confession siich as that given by [the
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defendant] to [the government informant], the risk that the confession is
unreliable, coupled with the profound impact that the confession has upon the jury,
requires a reviewing court to exercise extreme caution before determining that the
admission of the confession at trial was harmless.
Id. Indeed, certain evidentiary errors have a pervasive influence on the trial, "altering the
entire evidentiary picture" (State v. Hales* 2007 UT 14, | 86, 152 P.3d 321) and the trial
strategy, including whether and the defendant will testify, and the overall defense
presented in the case. Since confession evidence is profound, Fulminante, 499 U.S. at
296, its erroneous admission has a pervasive influence.
Second, confession evidence may allow the jury to make inferences where the
physical evidence is lacking. In this case, the State was unable to present primary
physical evidence at trial because the physical evidence was destroyed. See_ Tiedemann,
2007 UT 49, Tffi 8-9. The physical evidence included "two revolvers, a Code R kit, a
victim's wallet, heroin, an audio tape, a blood specimen, a make-up kit, drug
paraphernalia, various items of victims' clothing, bedding, a bone fragment found on one
victim's bed, a bottle of green liquid, a one gallon can of Toluene, .38 and .22 caliber
bullets, bullet fragments, shell casings, hair and saliva samples, and gunshot residue from
Tiedemann and one of the victims." IcL at | 8. After the destruction of evidence, the
State was left with statements from Deborah Pryor, who was in the trailer at the time of
the shootings (see R. 969:29-55), and investigative reports, photos and files prepared by
state agents, who were not witnesses to or present at the shootings. (See R. 969:96-106,
126-180; 971 (reflecting evidence from state agents and officers)); see also Tiedemann,
2007 UT 49, \ 9 (identifying secondary reports and files as the remaining evidence).
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Deborah testified that early in the morning on November 2, 1991, Tiedemann -hot
h< i InisK'inil ( liuck, her sister Susie, and her nephew Scotty, but he did not shoot her.
(See R. 969:37-55). Deborah's ercdibilih was in question,

\nu)iig inner things, the

defense established that she had her own history of drug use and abuse (see R. 969:78,
!-' J .

•" *

.i. made statements against Tiedemann only after officers promised not

to pursue drug charges ar;r i-.* ^ -r • H < k

' •

•;; . ^uwn,

• • -,i a; 5V~I

(recognizing that it a witness makes incriminating statements against another lo emi
1

i .iLiiiK.-nties, the statements lack trustworthiness)); and she was not entirely

forthcoming wiih ofjV. • «

•

> -.i-..^-.

^efc?> c, ^

.,

,. .

- ^ i - - recognizing that

Deborah did not reveal that she knew Pat and Tom.): see alsn R. ()*J5 • n \ • .'

. :*ic_

that il a witness lacks frankness, the jury may take that into consideration in assessing

State officers and agents testified that they col! - •

]

* vnw-v, *• *• '*• *

Tiedemann and Deborah. They acknowledged that Tiedemann was intoxicated during
the inteirugjtiuu, ami I In \ t un^idercd his responses to questions at times to be erratic.
(R. 971:85-87). In addition, they obtained statements fiorn I k-boiah implicating
Tiedemann in the offenses only after they made promises not to file charges against her.
I !•"'; i) r i -.s^-'Ml), Notably, Hie olticers returned to the trailer to match their investigation
and conclusions to the intoxicated ci^.fV^i. • i- • : '

'

-IUH^L- r-*

--"-- - nuv : ^),

Given the overall concerns with Deborah's testimony and the questions
..L:IL;

me investigation, Vinson's testimony about the pro-Miranda confession was

imporian ' "'-.•

••>«-.

,-

.Vc I tiiarreai, :^y r.^vi 4->.lo (Mating the
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prejudice analysis considers several factors including whether the witness's testimony
about the confession was important to the case, and the overall strength of the
prosecutor's case). Based on a review of the record and the circumstances here, the
inadmissible prz-Miranda statements tipped the balance against the defendant. The
violation warrants reversal since the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
Edgar Tiedemann respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's
ruling as it relates to a for-cause challenge against a prospective juror, and to evidence of
pre-Miranda confessions. Also, Tiedemann requests that this Court remand the case for a
new trial.
SUBMITTED this W

day of

fo<,c^*«^

2008.

Linda M. Jones
(f
Heidi Anne Buchi
Patrick Coram
Heather Brereton
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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I TURDER
1st Degree Felony
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- Disposition; 02/28/2008 Guilty
2. MURDER - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
- Disposition: 02/28/ 2008 Guilty
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Plea: Not Guilty
- Disposition: 02/28/2008 Guilty
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p* iges:

Case No: 021912452
Date:
May 02, 2008
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than five yeairs and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED MURDER a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
to run consecutive to each other
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EDGER TIEDMAN
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UTAH R. CRIM. P. 18 (2008)
RULE 18. SELECTION OF THE JURY
(a) The judge shall determine the method of selecting the jury and notify the parties at a
pretrial conference or otherwise prior to trial. The following procedures for selection arc
not exclusive.
(a)(1) Strike and replace method. The court shall summon the number of the jurors that
are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any alternates, for all
peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges for cause granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The
judge may and, at the request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause
outside the hearing of the jurors. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror
shall be called to fill the vacancy, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause.
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall provide a list of the jurors
remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining
jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire.
(a)(2) Struck method. The court shall summon the number of jurors that are to try the
cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any alternates, for all peremptory
challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause granted. At the direction of the
judge, the clerk shall call jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during the course of questioning or at the end thereof The judge may
and, at the request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the
hearing of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall
indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn until all
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining
jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire.
(a)(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in random order by computer,
the clerk may call the jurors in that random order.
l

(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examination of the
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court
may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the defendant. Prior to examining the jurors, the court may
make a preliminary statement of the case. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to make a preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties in advance of trial. . '
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror.
(c)(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for the trial of a
particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all jurors summoned
and may be taken by either party.
(c)(l)(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the
procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the
panel.
(c)(l)(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn and shall be in
writing or made upon the record. It shall specifically set forth the facts constituting the
grounds of the challenge.
(c)(l)(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing may be
had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is based. The jurors challenged,
and any other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing thereon.
(c)(l)(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel is allowed,
the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is concerned. If a challenge
is denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors to proceed.
(c)(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn to try the action,
except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be taken
first by the prosecution and then by the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given.
In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other felony cases
each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is
'

2

•

•

•

•

•

entitled to three peremptory ehallenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may
allow the defendants additional peremptory ehallenges and permit them to be exercised
separately or jointly.
(c) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be heard and determined by the court. The juror challenged and any other person may be examined as a
witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause may be taken on one or
more of the following grounds. On its own motion the eourt may remove a juror upon the
same grounds.
(e)(1) Want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law.
(e)(2) Any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of performing the
duties of a juror.
(e)(3) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted.
(e)(4) The existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship between
the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to have been victimized or
injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to
reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because the juror is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof
(e)(5) Having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or having
complained against or having been accused by the defendant in a criminal prosecution.
(e)(6) Having served on the grand jury which found the indictment.
(e)(7) Having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the particular offense charged.
(c)(8) Having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after the case was submitted
to it.
(e)(9) Having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant for the act
charged as an offense.
(c)(10) If the offense charged is punishable with death, the juror's views on capital pu' 3

nishmcnt would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties as a
juror in accordance with the instructions of the court and the juror's oath in subsection
(h).
(c)( 11) Because the juror is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or interested
in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carrying on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a like offense.
(c)(12) Because the juror has been a witness, either for or against the defendant on the
preliminary examination or before the grand jury.
(c)(13) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged.
(e)(14) Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that reasonably lead the
court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially. No person may serve as a juror,
if challenged, unless the judge is convinced the juror can and will act impartially and fairiy.
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense
alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before peremptory challenges arc
taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled. Alternate jurors, in the order
in which they arc called, shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution
and defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror
to be chosen. Alternate jurors shall be selected at the same time and in the same manner,
shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the same functions, powers, and privileges
as principal jurors. Kxccpt in bifurcated proceedings, an alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict.
The identity of the alternate jurors may be withheld until the jurors begin deliberations.
(h) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in substance, that
they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and
render a true verdict according to the evidence and the instructions of the court.

| Amended effective November 1, 2001; November 1, 2007.)

4

U.S. Const. Amend. V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time
of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.

U.S. Const. Amend. VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall cibridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
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PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

I don't think so.

THE COURT: All right, thanks.
Good morning, and thank you for being here.

The

attorneys may have a couple follow-up questions for you.

I

will just defer to them.
MR. COLBY:

You indicated that you were retired from

the sheriff's office.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes.
MR. COLBY: What was your job there?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

I worked in the jail and I worked

as a transportation officer, bringing inmates to court, and I
worked at the end as the court liaison officer, coordinating
the courts with the people that are in custody.
MS. BUCHI:

When did you retire?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

In 1995.

MR. COLBY: What about working for ICE?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:
part time there.

ThatTs my husband.

And he works

He is also retired sheriff's office and works

part time.
MR. COLBY: Would the fact that both you and your
husband are retired from the sheriff's office have an influence
on the way you would evaluate evidence in this case?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

I think it might, yes. But I

think it would be because of the fact that I wouldn' t be in awe
25 I of it as much as I would if I would have been a civilian, I
28

think.
MR. COLBY: Do you think you would be able to
evaluate the evidence fairly and make a deteimination based
solely on the evidence you had been presented?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

I think I would be able to

evaluate it more clearly.
MR. CORUM:

How involved were you in transportation?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

I would guard the inmates, it was

in the old court building, and guard the inmates in the holding
cell.

I would transport them to and from in the underground.

I sat in on the court hearings.

I only sat in on a couple of

trials.

Most of thena were all settled before it ever went to

trial.

Plus I didn't get any of the high-profile ones, being

my boss viewed me as being a little helpless because I was a
female.

So I didn't get to take Bundy or any of those guys to

court.
MR. CORUM:

You are aware of the policies and

procedures?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes.
MR. CORUM:
his brother Rocky.

You stated you knew Joey Finocchio and

How well do you know them?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

I worked 20 years with Rocky.

know Joey because he was involved a bit with the law
enforcement.

But I donTt know Joey nearly as well.

I just

know him more as RockyTs brother.
29
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MR. CORUM:

If Joey was to testify in this case would

you have any tendency to believe his testimony or disbelieve
his testimony because of your relationship with him?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

No, I donft have any opinion of

what his proclivity for truth is.

I don't know him that well.

It wouldn't make any difference to me.
MR. CORUM:

You know his brother pretty well.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes.
MR. CORUM:

Are you still in contact with Rocky?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

No. When I retired I pretty much

hibernated.
MS. PETERS: When you retired in

!

95 is that the last

time you had worked with jail transportation?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

I know I stopped working with

transportation quite a bit sooner, I guess it was five or six
years before that they made me court liaison officer.

It was

'90 or maybe !89 that I was court liaison officer.
MS. BUCHI:

You responded to the question about any

member of your family being the victim of a crime, that your
father was a victim 30 years ago of a kidnapping.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

Yeah. My sister was dating a kid

and had a child by him, that had a problem with alcohol and
drugs and so forth.
him.

And my father kind of hid my sister from

And he broke into the house one day and tried to get my

father to tell him where she was hiding out.

He since has
30

cleaned up his act, and the charges were dropped, it wasn't
really that he took him, he just made him get in the car,
wanted to show him where my sister was hidden out at.
Actually, one of his sons is —

I guess has been at my house.

So I mean, you know, I have a nephew, his father and things
seem to have evened out and so forth. My father was deceased
shortly after that from cancer, so he is not around to
influence anything or even —
you the truth.

I almost forgot about it, to tell

It is so far in the past it is something almost

like somebody else's story.
MS. BUCHI:

Is there anything about anything in that

experience that you feel would have an effect on your ability
to be an impartial juror?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

I donft think so. "When it

happened I removed myself from the jail when he was arrested.
I was in charge of the shift at that time.

I removed myself

from it. At the time I was upset, because I just heard they
were bringing him in for that, and I didn't know any of the
details or anything like that. But, no, I don't think so, not
anymore.

It has been too long past,
MS. BUCHI:

knew Mr. Teidemann.

You did not indicate by name that you
As you see him today do you recognize him?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No.
MS. BUCHI:

You donTt remember him?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

No.

In fact, I don't remember
31

the name, either, of any of the people.
THE COURT:

Okay, thanks.

MR. CORUM:

I guess the concern we would have is just

knowledge of transportation procedures.

I know, I think the

officers here do a very good job with that, but I think over
the course of a week it is going to be obvious that somebody is
sitting in the courtroom guarding Mr. Teidemann.

They do tend

to stick, out a little bit. Maybe for a lay person to come in,
chances are lessened that they are going to under stand that.
But I think this person would pick up on it immediately, quite
frankly.

They do tend to stick out a little bit, though they

try not to. The other stuff, I don't know.
MS. BUCHI:

The other stuff, I don't see as an issue.

But the transport and the fact that he will be being
transported.
THE COURT:

I think that the jurors are going to —

I

think all the jurors are going to assume something like that,
or at least hope that's the case, based on these charges.

I

just don't think —
MR. COLBY:

It shouldn't be surprising to them that a

defendant charged with more than a count of murder would be
under supervision of bailiffs.
MR. CORUM:

Due process requires we not let anybody

know he is in custody.
MS. BUCHI:

Certainly, she is going to know.

It is
32

not going to be a thought or maybe.
MS. PETERS:
system, too.

She is going to know.

She is familiar with the old courthouse

It could have changed since then.

to be a lot of people in this courtroom.

There is going

I don't know if they

are doing what they are supposed to be doing, which is paying
attention to the presentation of the evidence, they are not
going to know this.

It is not like when we are trying a

forgery trial and there is one guy sitting in the back with a
suit.

I think there is going to be a lot of people sitting in

the courtroom intermixed.
MS. HRERETON:

I think based on her former job being

a transport officer from the jail, she is going to have no
doubt Mr. Teidemann is in custody.

I think any of us would

know that, walking in a courtroom, hands down.

I think someone

who has actually held the job of doing transport is going to
know that.

The concern is despite the fact that everyone would

assume or hope someone charged with these crimes is in custody,
due process does require that that not enter into it, and I
think that's a problem.
MR. COLBY:

I think it is like Ms. Peters said, there

is going to be a lot of people in the courtroom, and it won't
be immediately obvious to anyone what the defendant's custodial
situation is.
MS. PETERS:

She said in light of her working there

she could be fair and impartial, and it would have no effect on
33

her, and she retired in f95.
THE COURT:

I think she is okay.

Deny the for cause.

Good morning, thank you for being here.
juror No. 20.

You are

There was one question that you didn't answer,

and it was, "Have you formed an opinion about the defendant's
guilt or innocence as a result of what you have heard, read or
seen."

Is that an oversight?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

No, because I haven't heard or

seen, I don't know anything about it other than what you said
in the court.
THE COURT:

Is your answer no, you haven't formed an

opinion?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

I haven't formed an opinion.

THE COURT: Any questions from any of the attorneys?
MR. CORUM: No.
MR. COLBY:

I don't have any.

THE COURT:

Thank you for being here.

Could you sign

the back sheet of your juror questionnaire?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:
THE COURT:

Is that all?

That's it. The attorneys may have some

questions.
MR. COLBY:

I had one question.

There was a question

on the form that asked if you had any medical condition that
may make it a hardship for you to serve on the jury.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

No.

I have tennis elbow, but
34
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1

context of clearly, if Mr. Tiedemann testifies and testifies

2

to something other than--

3

THE COURT:

Of course.

4

MR. CORUM:

--I did it, then all of this comes in,

5

spontaneous and otherwise.

6

THE COURT:

Okay.

7

Regarding the motion to suppress, the specific

8

finding is that all statements made by the defendant to

9

Officer Stinson were after he was in custody; therefore, the

10

rules governing custodial interrogation under Miranda and

11

subsequent cases do apply.

12

I'm granting the motion that any statements made in

13

response to questions are to be suppressed.

14

spontaneous statements within that, those can come in.

15

If there are

I caution you, though, Mr. Colby, Ms. Peters, that

16

it may be difficult for you to walk that very fine line.

17

Just--we don't know much and I'm relying on the

18

representations made by defendant's statement of facts that

19

may or may not be supported by the memory of the officer.

20

I would be cautious in eliciting that testimony, but will let

21

it in if it was spontaneous.

22
23
24
25

But

Then motion to exclude discussion of alleged sexual
assault.

I am granting that motion.
Motion to exclude irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial

portions of confession with regard to references to being

30

Page 1
2006 UT 50, *; 144 P.3d 1096, **;
560 Utah Adv. Rep. 9; 2006 Utah LEXIS 142, ***

LEXSEE 2006 UT 50

.
iyfc&fol&UM

/ j

004^^

State of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ralph Levin, Defendant and Petitioner.
No. 20050001
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
2006 UT 50; 144 P.3d 1096; 560 Utah Adv. Rep. 9; 2006 Utah LEXIS 142

September 8, 2006, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
[***1] Released for
Publication November 3, 2006.
On remand at State v. Levin, 156 P.3d 178, 2007 UTApp
65, 2007 Utah App. LEXIS 59 (2007)
PRIOR HISTORY: Fourth District, Provo Dept. The
Honorable Lynn W. Davis. No. 011402539.
State v. Levin, 101 P. 3d 846, 2004 UT App 396, 2004
Utah App. LEXIS 427 (2004)

COUNSEL: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Erin Riley,
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Margart P. Lindsay, Orem, for defendant.
JUDGES: DURRANT, Justice. Chief Justice Durham,
Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish, and
Justice Nehring concur in Justice Durrant's opinion.
OPINION BY: DURRANT
OPINION
[**1098] DURRANT, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
[*P1] The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects against self-incrimination. l To
preserve this right, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
defendants subjected to custodial interrogation are
entitled to a Miranda warning.2 Where such a warning is
not given, any incriminating statements made by a
defendant during the custodial interrogation are excluded
from evidence. 3 We granted certiorari in this case to
clarify the standard of review to be applied by a Utah
appellate court in reviewing a trial court's decision on
whether a defendant was subjected to custodial
interrogation.

1 U.S. Const, amend V.
[***2]
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436, 86 S.
Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
3 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 US. 291, 297, 30001, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L Ed. 2d 297 (1980);
Miranda, 384 US. at 444-45; Salt Lake City v.
Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1983).
[*P2] Following a jury trial, defendant Ralph Levin
was found guilty of possession of marijuana and
possession of drug paraphernalia. He challenged his
convictions before the Utah Court of Appeals, arguing
that the trial court had erred in failing to suppress certain
incriminating statements he made to police officers
without the benefit of a Miranda [**1099] warning. In
particular, he contended that the trial court had erred in
concluding that the officers had not subjected him to
"custodial interrogation."
[*P3]
The court of appeals upheld Levin's
convictions. It held that the trial court had erred when it
concluded that Levin was not interrogated but affirmed
the trial court's determination that he was not "in
custody." 4 In so doing, the court of appeals expressly
applied an "abuse [***3] of discretion" standard to the
custody determination.5 It did not specify the standard of
review that it applied to the trial court's interrogation
determination.6 On certiorari, Levin challenges the court
of appeals custody determination, arguing that it was
error for the court of appeals to apply the deferential
"abuse of discretion" standard of review.
4 State v. Levin, 2004 UTApp 396, PP11, 2223, 101 P.3d 846.
5 Id.P7.
6 Seeid.PP7, 11.
[*P4] Because the "custody" and "interrogation"
elements of a trial court's custodial interrogation
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determination overlap and together serve to answer a
single inquiry into whether a Miranda warning was
necessary in a particular case, we address the standard of
review for the trial court's custodial interrogation
determination as a whole. A trial court's application of
the legal concept of custodial interrogation to the facts of
a particular case presents a mixed question of fact and
law. Therefore, we select the appropriate [***4]
standard of review using the general factors and policy
considerations that we have discussed in State v. Pena 7
and its progeny. However, we take this opportunity to
revise our statement of the original four factors from
Pena into a three-factor, policy-based balancing test. We
then conclude that the three factors of this revised
balancing test weigh in favor of reviewing for correctness
a trial court's custodial interrogation determination.
7 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994).
[*P5] Ultimately, the important policy of promoting
uniformity in police officers' administration of Miranda
warnings and in courts' application of Miranda to
exclude a defendant's incriminating statements mandates
greater appellate involvement in defining the concept of
custodial interrogation as it applies to the facts of
individual cases. Because the court of appeals applied a
deferential standard in reviewing the trial court's
determination that Levin was not in custody, we remand
to the court [***5] of appeals for application of the
"correctness" standard of review.

BACKGROUND
[*P6] Because our opinion is concerned only with
defining the appropriate standard of review, we limit our
discussion of the facts in this case. Although somewhat
abbreviated, our factual discussion incorporates
undisputed facts established at trial as well as those found
by the trial court in connection with Levin's initial motion
to dismiss. We consider undisputed facts from trial
because at the beginning of the trial Levin made an
appropriate continuing objection to the introduction of
his incriminating statements by renewing his earlier
motion to suppress those statements.8
8 See State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1076
(Utah 1987) (Durham, J., concurring separately,
joined by Howe & Zimmerman, JJ.) (indicating
that there will be sufficient notice of a continuing
objection if counsel renews the objection at trial
outside the presence of the jury).
[*P7] Levin's convictions for drug offenses [***6]
are based on evidence gathered during an approximately
one-and-one-half hour traffic stop on the Provo Dike

Road in a rural area near Utah Lake. Deputy Wayne
Keith of the Utah County Sheriffs Office was on patrol
when he noticed a convertible bearing expired
registration tags parked on the side of the road. Three
occupants were sitting in the convertible with the roof
down. Without activating his lights or siren, Deputy
Keith parked behind the convertible. He approached on
foot and saw several open containers of alcohol in plain
view inside the convertible.
[*P8]
Deputy Keith asked the convertible's
occupants for identification. Levin was in [**1100] the
driver's seat, Michael Winger was a passenger in the
front seat, and Richard Johnson was sitting in the
backseat. Deputy Keith had all three men step out of the
vehicle and notified them that he was going to search for
more open containers. His search of the vehicle's center
console uncovered an odor of marijuana and a metal
"socket" tool that had been fashioned into a pipe, which
appeared to contain burnt and unburnt marijuana. Deputy
Keith also found several small bags of marijuana in a
backpack claimed by Johnson.
[*P9] There [***7] is some dispute over the
precise chronology of the following events, but the
record establishes that Deputy Keith called in two
deputies who were certified drug recognition experts.
Because the vehicle belonged to Levin and he had been
sitting in the driver's seat, Deputy Keith pulled Levin
aside and personally subjected him to a sobriety test
designed to identify alcohol impairment. He passed. The
drug recognition experts then subjected Levin to
additional field sobriety tests. Those officers determined
that Levin had a fast pulse rate and a lack of convergence
of the eyes. They informed Deputy Keith that they
believed Levin was under the influence of marijuana. At
some point, either before or after these tests, Deputy
Keith asked Levin at least once about the socket, and
Levin asserted that he knew nothing about it and had not
smoked marijuana. Deputy Keith also patted Levin down
but found no marijuana and no scent of marijuana on
him.
[*P10] However, after the drug recognition experts
presented their conclusions to Deputy Keith, Deputy
Keith pulled Levin aside and stated: "There's no doubt in
my mind that you've been smoking marijuana." Deputy
Keith's accusation was not phrased [***8] in the form of
a question, and Deputy Keith was not "in Levin's face."
Deputy Keith testified that he did not expect a response
because Levin had already denied using marijuana.
Nevertheless, Levin answered by saying that "he had
taken a couple of hits" with Richard Johnson but that
Michael Winger had not used any marijuana. He also
added that they had smoked out of a pipe that the officers

presumption.

Patrick argues that the unrebutted presumption of

reasonableness establishes his innocence of Scott's murder as a
lawful defense of habitation.

Thus, argues Patrick, the district

court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict made at
the close of the State's case-in-chief and at the close of all
evidence.

Patrick also argues that the lack of evidence

rebutting the presumption renders the jury verdict against him
unsupported by the evidence.

We decline to review the district court's denial of
Patrick's first motion for directed verdict, made at the close o
the State's case-in-chief, because any error now asserted by
Patrick was not preserved in the district court.

Patriok^s

arguments on appeal rely solely on the presiim^fei^m- created -fey—tj^e
defense of habitation statute, see id., while his first motion
for directed verdict in the district court asserted only that the
State had not met its burden on Patrick's separate claim of selfildefense, see id. § 76-2-402 f^Qd^8l'**~~—*TTT order to preserve^n-issue for appeal, a defendant must raise the issue before the
district court in such a way that the court is placed on notice
of potential error and then has the opportunity to correct or
avoid the error."

State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT 219, \ 10, 189

A
P.3d 85, cert, denied, 199 P.3d 970 (Utah 2008).
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had not located. At no time was Levin formally arrested,
handcuffed, or given a Miranda warning, although he
was issued a citation.
[*P11] In addition to the investigation of Levin, the
officers questioned the two passengers. The officers
briefly questioned Winger about smoking marijuana.
They read Johnson his Miranda rights and questioned
him about the marijuana found in his backpack. Johnson
admitted that he had been smoking with Levin, but later
said that he had smoked the marijuana alone. When the
officers had completed their investigation, they allowed
Levin and his passengers to leave in the convertible. As
the convertible started to drive away, one of the officers
spotted a pipe located directly under the convertible. The
officers stopped the convertible, and Deputy Keith asked
[***9] if this was the pipe they had used to smoke.
Johnson stated that it was.
[*P12] Levin was later charged with possession and
use of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
with having an open container in a vehicle. Levin pleaded
no contest to the open container charge. With regard to
the drug offenses, he pleaded not guilty and then moved
to suppress the incriminating statements he had made to
Deputy Keith, arguing that despite being subjected to
custodial interrogation, he had not been given the
required Miranda warning. The trial court denied the
motion. It determined that Levin had not been in custody
or subject to interrogation. At the commencement of trial,
Levin renewed his motion, which the trial court again
denied. Following the trial, a jury found Levin guilty of
both possession of marijuana with a prior conviction and
possession of drug paraphernalia.
[*P13] On appeal, the court of appeals concluded
that Levin had been subjected to "interrogation," but it
applied a deferential "abuse of discretion" standard of
review to the trial court's determination that Levin was
not "in custody" and affirmed that determination. 9 It did
not specify the standard [***10] of review that it applied
to the trial court's interrogation determination.
9 State v. Levin, 2004 UT App 396, PP 7, 11,
22-23, 101P.3d846.
[*P14] Levin now challenges the court of appeals'
decision, arguing that the court of [**1101] appeals
erred in reviewing the trial court's custody determination
under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. We
granted Levin's petition for certiorari to decide whether
the court of appeals applied the correct standard of
review. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
section 78-2-2(5).
STANDARD OF REVIEW

[*P15] On certiorari, we review for correctness the
decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the
trial court. 10 The correctness of the court of appeals'
decision turns, in part, on whether it accurately reviewed
the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of
review. u
10 State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, Pll, 103 P.3d
699.
11 Id.
ANALYSIS
[*P16] Levin argues that the court of appeals erred
in reviewing the trial court's determination that he had
not been "in custody" under an "abuse of discretion"
standard. We agree. The importance of uniformity in
Utah courts' application of Fifth Amendment Miranda
protections leads us to conclude that Utah appellate
courts should review for correctness trial courts' custodial
interrogation determinations.
[*P17] We will begin our analysis by describing the
policy-based balancing test that guides our selection of a
standard of review for mixed questions of fact and law.
We will then apply this balancing test to the mixed
question of custodial interrogation.
I. WE DETERMINE THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
FOR A MIXED QUESTION OF FACT AND LAW BY
EMPLOYING A POLICY-BASED BALANCING TEST
[*P18] In selecting the deferential standard of
review that it applied to the trial court's "custody"
determination in this case, the court of appeals engaged
in an incomplete analysis of the factors that we discussed
in State v. Pena n and did not adequately consider
[***12] the policy implications that we highlighted in
State v. Brake. n Given the lingering difficulties in the
application of our standard of review jurisprudence, we
take this opportunity to further discuss the role of policy
in our selection of a standard of review and to refine our
statement of the balancing test that we use in selecting a
standard of review for a mixed question of fact and law.
12 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).
13 2004 UT95, P14, 103 P.3d 699.
A. Standards of Review Apportion Power Between the
Trial and Appellate Courts Based on the Courts'
Institutional Competencies
[*P19] We have previously explained that "[t]he
primary function of a standard of review is to apportion

ANALYSIS
I.

Utah's Defense of Habitation Statute
Patrick's first set of arguments on appeal involve Utah's

defense of habitation statute, Utah Code section 76-2-405.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405.

Section 76-2-405 governs the use of

force to defend a dwelling against unlawful entry or attack.
id. § 76-2-405(1).

See

See

Section 76-2-405 further establishes, under

certain circumstances, a presumption that a person who uses force
to defend a dwelling has "acted reasonably and had a reasonable
fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury."
id. § 76-2-405(2).3

See

Patrick raises several arguments on appeal

in an attempt to establish that his shooting of Scott was
justified as a defense of habitation as a matter of law.

Each of Patrick's arguments invoking section 76-2-405
presumes that the evidence presented to the jury gave rise to the
presumption of reasonableness enunciated in section 76-2-405(2),
and that there was insufficient evidence to rebut the

3.

Section 76-2-405(2) states, in its entirety:
The person using force or deadly force in
defense of habitation is presumed for the
purpose of both civil and criminal cases to
have acted reasonably and had a reasonable
fear of imminent peril of death or serious
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry
is unlawful and is made or attempted by use
of force, or in a violent and tumultuous
manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or
for the purpose of committing a felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405(2).
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power and, consequently, responsibility between trial and
appellate courts for determining an issue." u Standards of
review should allocate discretion between the trial and
appellate courts in a way that takes account of the
"relative capabilities of each level of the court [***13]
system to take evidence and make findings of fact in the
face of conflicting evidence, on one hand, and to set
binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other." 15 These
considerations are critical in selecting a standard of
review from along a spectrum of deference that runs from
highly deferential review under a "clearly erroneous"
standard on one end to completely nondeferential review
under a "correctness" standard on the other end. ,6
14 State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265-66
(Utah 1993).
15 Id. at 1266.
16 See Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)
("[0]ne can visualize the traditional standard-ofreview scheme as a continuum of deference
anchored at either end by the clearly erroneous
and
correction-of-error
standards,
which
correspond with whether the issue is
characterized as one of fact or of law.").
[*P20] Because a trial court is in a better position
to "judg[e] credibility and resolv[e]
[**1102]
evidentiary conflicts," an appellate [***14]
court
reviews the trial court's findings of fact for clear error. 17
Conversely, an appellate court reviews a trial court's
conclusions of law for correctness because "a single trial
judge is in an inferior position to determine what the
legal content of [a legal concept] should be [whereas] a
panel of appellate judges, with their collective experience
and their broader perspective, is better suited to that
task."18 Additionally, the published decisions of appellate
courts "provid[e] state-wide standards that guide law
enforcement and prosecutorial officials." 19
17 Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271.
18
Id.; accord Pena, 869 P.2d at 936
("[A]ppellate courts have traditionally been seen
as having the power and duty to say what the law
is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the
jurisdiction.").
19 Thurman, 846P.2d at 1277.
[*P21] The analytical complexity of our standard of
review is at its height when we review a trial court's
[***15] application of a legal concept to a given set of
facts. When we review so-called "mixed questions of fact
and law," the considerations that favor a more-deferential
standard of review and those that favor a less-deferential
standard of review compete for dominance, and the
amount of deference that results will vary according to

the nature of the legal concept at issue. Mixed questions
of fact and law involving different legal issues will often
require different standards of review.20
20 See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938; see also Searle v.
Milburn Irrig. Co., 2006 UT 16, P16, 133 P.3d
382 ("The measure of discretion afforded varies,
however, according to the issue being reviewed."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
[*P22] While we have said that, ultimately, "the
legal effect of [the] facts is the province of the appellate
courts," 21 our prior decisions recognize that, with regard
to many mixed questions of fact and law, it is either not
possible or not wise for an appellate [***16] court to
define strictly how a legal concept is to be applied to
each new set of facts. 22 Where the correct application of
a legal concept is difficult to explain using a generally
applicable standard, overinvolvement by an appellate
court can lead to confusing and inconsistent
pronouncements of the law. 23 We have recognized that
the application of such a legal concept incorporates a de
facto grant of discretion to the trial court, and,
accordingly, we review the trial court's decision on the
mixed question of fact and law with deference
commensurate to that discretion.24
21 Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181
(Utah 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-40.
23 Id. at 940.
24 Id. at 937-39; State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29,
P27, 137P.3d787.
[*P23] But with regard to certain mixed questions
where uniform application is of high importance, as in
the context of [***17] Fourth Amendment protections,
we have held that policy considerations dictate that the
application of the legal concept should be strictly
controlled by the appellate courts. 25 Thus, if we
determine that society's interest in establishing consistent
statewide standards outweighs other considerations, we
grant no discretion to the trial court, and we review the
mixed question for correctness.26
25 See Brake, 2004 UT 95, PP14-15, 103 P.3d
699; see also State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, P26,
63 P. 3d 650 (stating that there must be "statewide
standards that guide law enforcement and
prosecutorial officials" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
26 See Brake, 2004 UT 95, PP14-15, 103 P.3d
699.
[*P24] We have described the varying levels of

the evidence, and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it, to ensure that it provides a proper basis for conviction
and is not so "inconclusive . . . that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt" as to Patrick's guilt.

Id. ^ 23

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P. 2d
232, 236 (Utah 1992)).

Patrick's arguments underestimate the jury's broad
prerogative to evaluate the reasonableness of a defendant's
actions for purposes of applying a justification defense.

The

breadth of the jury's role in evaluating justification defenses
is illustrated in State v. Law, 106 Utah 196, 147 P.2d 324
(1944).

In Law, the defendant was convicted of voluntary

manslaughter after fatally stabbing an unarmed man in a fight.
See id. at 3 25-26.

The defendant, who presented no evidence at

trial, challenged the district court's denial of his request for
a directed verdict at the close of the State's case-in-chief.
See id. at 325.

On appeal, the defendant argued that "in view of

the disparity in the size and strength of the two men[5] and the
4.

(...continued)
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted.'"
Id. f 16 n.7 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).

5. "The testimony is that [the victim] was a well muscled man,
weighing at least 22 0 pounds, 'six feet easy' and a powerful
strapping mam. [The witness] 'would judge Law to weigh 125
(continued...)
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discretion afforded trial courts in Pena and Brake using
Professor Maurice Rosenberg's pasture metaphor, which
describes the discretion given to a trial court on a
particular mixed question as a pasture bounded by fences
that represent [***18] the boundaries of the legal
concept. 27 Because the established boundaries of each
legal concept are unique, different mixed questions are
associated with [**1103] pastures of different sizes. 28
When a trial court stays within the pasture associated
with a specific legal concept, it is free "to reach one of
several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a
particular set of facts without risking reversal." 29
Discretion is broadest~and the standard of review is most
deferential-when the application of a legal concept is
highly fact dependant and variable. 30 Discretion is most
confmed-and the standard of review is nondeferentialwhen the legal concept is easily defined by appellate
courts or when appellate courts erect strict fences for
policy reasons.3l
27
See Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38 (citing
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the
Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L.
Rev. 635, 662-63 (1971)); Brake, 2004 UT 95,
P14,103P.3d699.
28 See Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38.
29
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, P27, 137 P.3d 787
(quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 937).
30 See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-40.
31 See Brake, 2004 UT 95, PI 4, 103 P. 3d 699
("Considerations of policy play a central part in
the placement of discretionary fences.")
B. The Test We Employ in Determining the Standard of
Review for Mixed Questions Balances Policy
Considerations Related to Courts' Institutional
Competencies
[*P25] In Pena and its progeny, we have articulated
four factors to guide Utah appellate courts in the difficult
task of selecting the appropriate standard of review for a
mixed question of fact and law from the spectrum of
possible levels of deference to a trial court. Most
recently, we discussed these factors in State v. Virgin. 32
However, this four-factor test has continued to cause
some confusion. As will be explained, we therefore take
this occasion to refine the test by eliminating a factor that
has proven to be unhelpful and rephrasing the others to
better reflect the purpose of the test. Our revised test
considers the following factors: (1) the degree of variety
and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule
[***20] is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial
court's application of the legal rule relies on "facts"

observed by the trial judge, "such as a witness's
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of
the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record
available to appellate courts;" and (3) other "policy
reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion to
trial courts."33
32 2006 UT 29, P28, 137 P.3d 787 ("[W]e
quantify [a trial court's] discretion by weighing
the following factors: (1) whether the facts to
which the legal rule is to be applied are so
complex and varying that no rule adequately
addressing the relevance of all these facts can be
spelled out; (2) whether the situation to which the
legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new
to the courts that appellate judges are unable to
anticipate and articulate definitively what factors
should be outcome determinative; (3) whether the
trial judge has observed 'facts,' such as a witness's
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the
application of the law that cannot be adequately
reflected in the record available to appellate
courts; and (4) whether there are policy reasons
that weigh for or against granting discretion to
trial courts, such as when substantial
constitutional rights are implicated." (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
[***21]
33 Id.
[*P26] As to the first factor, the greater the
complexity and variety of the facts, the stronger the case
for appellate deference. As to the second, the greater the
importance of a trial court's credibility assessments that
cannot be adequately reflected in the record, the stronger
the case for appellate deference. The third factor requires
that we take into consideration policy factors related to
the degree of deference that should be applied. Even
where a case for appellate deference is strong under the
first two factors, policy considerations may nevertheless
lead us to limit that deference.34
34 See Brake, 2004 UT95, P14, 103 P.3d 699.
[*P27] While the above balancing test reflects the
principles relied upon in our opinions in Pena and its
progeny and does not significantly depart from our prior
statements regarding mixed questions of fact and law, we
have rephrased the language of [***22] the factors and
have eliminated the second Pena factor~the novelty of
the situation. We have made these revisions to enhance
the analytical consistency and clarity of the balancing test
to be applied in placing different mixed questions along
the spectrum of deference and discretion.

afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury
and may fully recount the evidence adduced and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom.").

And, as with most other

trial issues, a party must preserve arguments about the propriety
of closing arguments by objecting to the offending statements at
they are made.

See State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT

94 P.3d 186 ("[W]e generally will not examine the
State's closi^r^y^rgu^^nt

if the defendant failed to timely object

to it><^ Ty") . Here, Patrick did not preserve his arguments
for appeal by raising a timely and adequate objection.

During closing arguments, the State addressed Scott's entry
into the Patrick residence and argued that it was not unlawful.
Patrick now complains that the State misrepresented the facts by
asserting that " [tjhere is nothing in any of the evidence but
[Patrick's] statements that this entry was unlawful." [Blue pQ
^A2^J^^^2QS-^L^.]

Patrick also argues that the State misstated

the law when it argued that Scott's permissive entry into the
Patrick home could not have become unlawful upon Scott's refusal
to leave as directed, but instead could be deemed unlawful only
if it was "unlawful at the time he crosse [d] the threshold [of
the Patrick home]."

Patrick's only objection at the time

was that the State's argument was "a misstatement of the law."
The district court overruled Patrick's objection, noting that it
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[*P28] As the first three factors for determining the
standard of review have been [**1104] phrased in Pena
and its progeny, their application suggested only "yes" or
"no" answers, 35 making the factors ill-suited to use in a
balancing test. Further, by quoting these first three Pena
factors verbatim in the process of transforming them into
a balancing test, we have in many of our earlier
statements of the balancing test overemphasized their
importance and artificially divorced them from our
central concern with the policy implications of selecting a
more- deferential or less-deferential standard of review.36
In contrast, we have recently reaffirmed the centrality of
policy considerations in our decision in Brake 37 and
treated policy considerations as a "fourth" Pena factor in
State v. Virgin.38 Thus, to clarify the appropriate test, we
have rephrased the factors here in a manner [***23] that
better reflects their usefulness in selecting a standard of
review from somewhere along the spectrum of deference.
35 See Pena, 869 P.2d at 939 (listing three
circumstances in which the trial court should be
given discretion, namely: "(i) when the facts to
which the legal rule is to be applied are so
complex and varying that no rule adequately
addressing the relevance of all these facts can be
spelled out; (ii) when the situation to which the
legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new
to the courts that appellate judges are unable to
anticipate and articulate definitively what factors
should be outcome determinative; and (iii) when
the trial judge has observed 'facts,' such as a
witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to
the application of the law that cannot be
adequately reflected in the record available to
appellate courts" (quoting Rosenberg, supra note
27, at 662-63)).
36 See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto,
Inc., 2000 UT 83, PP10, 12, 12 P.3d 580
(quoting and applying the original three Pena
factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph
that there are "no policy reasons outweighing" the
first three factors suggesting a deferential
standard).
r***24]

37 2004 UT95, PP14-15, 103 P.3d 699.
38 2006 UT29, P28, 137 P.3d 787.
[*P29] In the process of rephrasing the test, we
have dropped the "novelty" factor because it has rarely, if
ever, proven to be helpful to our analysis. As it was
phrased in Pena, the novelty factor considered whether
"the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied
is sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are
unable to anticipate and articulate definitively what

factors should be outcome determinative." 39 The
situations in which this factor required more deferential
review were unclear. Our cases demonstrate that legal
issues involving situations that are completely new to the
appellate courts are rare. Furthermore, where a situation
is novel, it is not self-evident that the appellate courts
should restrain themselves from exercising searching
review and should instead take a wait-and-see approach
to establishing a legal test. In the language of the pasture
metaphor, we are not convinced that we should
necessarily refrain from establishing fences that restrain
trial courts simply [***25] because a situation is novel
and anticipating the future development of the law may
be difficult.
39 869 P.2d at 939.
[*P30] Furthermore, because this "novelty" factor
was prominent in the original Pena test despite its rare
applicability, it has often proven unwieldy, cluttered the
analysis, or been ignored. For example, we have
sometimes stated that the situation presented was not
"new," but then have addressed whether we could
articulate "outcome determinative factors." *° The later
inquiry is substantially the same as the inquiry that we
make under the first factor, namely: the degree to which
the variety and complexity of the facts make it difficult to
articulate a legal test or factors that are outcome
determinative. Such mixing of the separate analytical
inquiries from the first and second original Pena factors
has [**1105] only served to confuse the analysis and
may have led appellate courts to place too much weight
on the difficulty of articulating a rule. Ultimately, in the
rare [***26] instances where this "novelty of the
situation" factor may be important, it could fall under the
umbrella of other policy considerations.
40 See Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co., 2006 UT 16,
PI 7, 133 P. 3d 382 (concluding that "at least
some deference should be granted to the district
court's application of the law to the facts" where it
was "exceedingly difficult to craft a uniform rule
neatly applicable in all situations"); Butler,
Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest
Pipeline Operating, 2004 UT 67, P47, 98 P.3d 1
(concluding that the second factor supported
additional deference to a trial court's beneficial
use determination, even though the beneficial use
doctrine "has roots dating back to the turn of the
last century"); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,
1245 (Utah 1998) (concluding that although "the
unjust enrichment doctrine has ancient roots," the
second factor supported a "broad degree of
discretion in applying the law" where "the court's

argued on appeal, and thus we do not consider them.

See State v.

Robison, 2006 UT 65, f 22, 147 P.3d 448 ("Other than for
jurisdictional reasons [the court of appeals] should not normally
search the record for unargued and unbriefed reasons to reverse a
[district] court judgment." (alterations in original) (quotation
omitted)); State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT 219, % 10, 189 P.3d 85,>j\
cert, denied, 199 P.3d 970 (Utah 2008) ((stating requirement
"issues must be preserved for appeal by presentation to the
.strict court

The district court admitted the challenged evidence under
rule 4 04(a), and Patrick has neither preserved nor argued any
error in the district court's application of that rule.
Accordingly, we will not disturb the district court's ruling.

III.

Prosecutorial Misconduct

'

Finally, Patrick argues that the State misstated the law and
the facts in its closing argument.

Generally, parties have wide

latitude in closing arguments to characterize the evidence and
the proper application of the law to the evidence.

See, e.g.,

State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989) ("Counsel is

9. (...continued)
character was not in issue. See id. ff 6-15. We note that Leber
was issued well after the district court's decision in this case
and is currently under review by the Utah Supreme Court upon writ
of certiorari, and we do not rely on its substantive reasoning in
reaching our decision today.
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ability to state clearly the outcome-determinative
factors remains elusive").
[***27] [*P31] In making these changes to the
way that we articulate the established standard, our intent
is to improve upon our statement of the test that we apply
to mixed questions of fact and law without changing its
core substance. As before, our goal in applying the above
balancing test is to allocate tasks between the trial and
appellate courts based on their institutional roles and
competencies.
II. WHETHER A DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECTED
TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION IS A MIXED
QUESTION OF FACT AND LAW THAT WE
REVIEW FOR CORRECTNESS.
[*P32] Having set forth the balancing test to be
used in selecting an appropriate standard of review for a
mixed question of fact and law, we now apply the test to
answer the question at hand; namely, what is the standard
appellate courts apply in reviewing a trial court's
determination that a person was or was not subjected to
custodial interrogation for the purpose of Fifth
Amendment Miranda protections? To do so, we will first
outline the legal concept of custodial interrogation in the
context of our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. We will
then apply the three-factor balancing test to the mixed
question of custodial interrogation, discussing [***28]
each of the three factors in turn.
A. The Legal Concept of Custodial Interrogation
[*P33] To apply the three-factor mixed question
test set forth above, we must first understand the legal
concept of custodial interrogation, which trial courts
apply to the facts of each case. The Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution guarantees that a person
shall not be "compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." We protect this right by
excluding from a defendant's criminal trial any
incriminating statement that the defendant made to police
officers while under custodial interrogation if the officers
did not give a Miranda warning.41
41 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297,
300-01, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.
Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
[*P34] Generally, custodial interrogation consists
of questioning or use of other techniques of persuasion
"'initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
[***29] has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.'"42 Thus, custodial interrogation occurs where there

is both (1) custody or other significant deprivation of a
suspect's freedom and (2) interrogation. These two
elements are interrelated.
42 Innis, 446 U.S. at 298-99 (quoting Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16
L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); accord Stansbury v.
California, 511 US. 318, 323, 114 S. Ct. 1526,
128L.Ed. 2d293 (1994).
[*P35] We often describe the first element as an
inquiry into whether a suspect was "in custody." A
person is in custody when "[the person's] freedom of
action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal
arrest." 43 The inquiry is objective and considers "how a
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have
understood his situation." u A suspect may understand
himself or herself to be in custody based either on
physical evidence or on the nature of the officer's
instructions and [***30] questions. Therefore, we focus
on both the evidence of restraint and on objective
evidence of the officers' intentions. 45 As stated by the
U.S. Supreme Court,

[**1106] [A]n officer's views concerning
the nature of an interrogation, or beliefs
concerning the potential culpability of the
individual being questioned, may be one
among many factors that bear upon the
assessment whether that individual was in
custody, but only if the officer's views or
beliefs were somehow manifested to the
individual under interrogation and would
have affected how a reasonable person in
that position would perceive his or her
freedom to leave.46

43 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US. 420, 440,
104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also State v.
Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996).
44
Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324 (internal
quotation marks omitted); accord Mirquet, 914

P.2datll47.
45

See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; Salt Lake

presumption.

Patrick argues that the unrebutted presumption of

reasonableness establishes his innocence of Scott's murder as a
lawful defense of habitation.

Thus, argues Patrick, the district

court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict made at
the close of the State's case-in-chief and at the close of all
evidence.

Patrick also argues that the lack of evidence

rebutting the presumption renders the jury verdict against him
unsupported by the evidence.

We decline to review the district court's denial of
Patrick's first motion for directed verdict, made at the close of
the State's case-in-chief, because any error now asserted by
Patrick was not preserved in the district court.

Patirick's

arguments on appeal rely solely on the presumption created by the
defense of habitation statute, see id., while his first motion
for directed verdict in the district court asserted only that the
State had not met its burden on Patrick's separate claim of selfdefense, see id. § 76-2-402 (2008) .

"In order to preserve an

issue for appeal, a defendant must raise the issue before the
district court in such a way that the court is placed on notice
of potential error and then has the opportunity to correct or
avoid the error."

State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT$2i9, f 10, 189

P.3d 85, cert, denied, 199 P.3d 970 (Utah 2008).
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City v Carrier, 664 P 2d 1168, 1170 (Utah
1983).

the trial court is warranted where the facts "are so
complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing
the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out." 53

46 Stansbury, 511 US at 325.
[*P36]
For instance, when investigatory
questioning shifts to accusatory questioning, the
existence of custody is likely because this often indicates
to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave. By
making accusations, the police officer indicates that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the defendant committed it.47 In Salt
Lake City v Carrier,48 we set forth four factors that aid in
determining whether a defendant is "in custody" for
purposes of the Miranda protections: 49 "(1) the site of
interrogation, (2) whether the investigation focused on
the accused, (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest
were present, and (4) the length and form of
interrogation"50
47 See Mirquet, 914 P 2d at 1148 (indicating
that accusatory questioning is relevant, but does
not necessarily establish a coercive environment),
Carner, 664 P 2d at 1170 (recognizing import of
accusatory statements); State v Snyder, 860 P 2d
351, 357 (Utah Ct App 7995Xsame).
r***321

48 664 P 2d 1168 (Utah 1983).
49
See Mirquet, 914 P 2d at 1147 n2
(explaining that although Carner was decided
under Article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, the same test applies under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution)
50 Carner, 664 P 2d at 1171.
[*P37] Once a trial court determines that the
defendant was "in custody," it must then decide whether
the incriminating statement was the product of
interrogation 51 Interrogation is "either express
questioning or its functional equivalent" and it
incorporates any "words or actions on the part of police
officers that they should have known were reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response " 52
51 Rhode Island v Inms, 446 US 291, 298301, 100 S Ct 1682, 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1980).
52 Id at 300-02
B Application of the Balancing [***33] Test to the
Mixed Question of Custodial Interrogation
[*P38] Applymg our three-factor balancing test to
the legal concept of custodial interrogation, we first
consider the degree of complexity and variety in the facts
that
are
involved
in custodial
interrogation
determinations. We have said that additional deference to

53 Pena, 869 P 2d at 939.
[*P39] We initially note that the rules defining both
the custody and interrogation prongs of custodial
interrogation are well defined and adequate. We set forth
the four Carner factors for determining custody more
than twenty years ago and they continue to guide us
today Furthermore, in light of the objective nature of
both prongs of the custodial interrogation test, the
relevant facts are typically not particularly complex and
can usually be identified with specificity. [***34] The
location of the interrogation usually can be found in the
record, and the significance of the location is often
intuitive. Places that are confined or isolated are more
likely to indicate custody than those that are public and
open 54 The length of the interrogation can usually be
closely approximated and compared with the length of
ordinary investigative detentions As for indicia of arrest,
we generally look to whether handcuffs, drawn [**1107]
guns, locked doors, threats, or coercion are present. 55
The question of whether the defendant was a "focus" of
the investigation depends on whether the investigators'
actions indicated that they had identified the defendant as
a likely criminal culprit. Finally, the facts that are
relevant to the objective legal question of whether the
police officers should have known that their words or
actions were likely to elicit an incriminating response
consist of the words or actions themselves, their meaning,
and their likely impact In sum, although the facts relating
to custodial interrogation will vary from case to case, this
first factor of the balancing test weighs against appellate
deference because such facts typically are not "so
complex and [***35] varying that no rule adequately
addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled
out."56
54 Compare Mirquet, 914 P 2d at 1148 (noting
that one factor indicating custody was location of
questioning inside the confines of the front seat of
a police car) with Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US
420, 438, 104 S Ct 3138, 82 L Ed 2d 317
(1984) (suggesting that because the typical traffic
stop is conducted where passersby may witness
the interaction, a motorist does not feel
completely at the mercy of the police).
55 See State v Wood, 868 P 2d 70, 83 (Utah
1993); Carner, 664P2dat 1171.
56 See Pena, 869 P 2d at 939.
[*P40] Second, we consider the degree to which the
application of the legal rule relies on "facts" observed by

ANALYSIS
I.

Utah's Defense of Habitation Statute
Patrick's first set of arguments on appeal involve Utah's

defense of habitation statute, Utah Code section 76-2-405.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405.

Section 76-2-405 governs the use of

force to defend a dwelling against unlawful entry or attack.
id. § 76-2-405(1).

See

See

Section 76-2-405 further establishes, under

certain circumstances, a presumption that a person who uses force
to defend a dwelling has "acted reasonably and had a reasonable
fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury."
id. § 76-2-405(2).3

See

Patrick raises several arguments on appeal

in an attempt to establish that his shooting of Scott was
justified as a defense of habitation as a matter of law.

Each of Patrick's arguments invoking section 76-2-405
presumes that the evidence presented to the jury gave rise to the
presumption of reasonableness enunciated in section 76-2-405(2),
and that there was insufficient evidence to rebut the

3.

Section 76-2-405(2) states, in its entirety:
The person using force or deadly force in
defense of habitation is presumed for the
purpose of both civil and criminal cases to
have acted reasonably and had a reasonable
fear of imminent peril of death or serious
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry
is unlawful and is made or attempted by use
of force, or in a violent and tumultuous
manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or
for the purpose of committing a felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405(2).
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the trial judge-such as a witness's appearance and
demeanor-that cannot be adequately reflected in the
record available to appellate courts. The greater the
significance of these types of facts, [***36] the greater
the case for appellate deference. Although the trial court's
superior position to make credibility determinations can
be important with respect to custodial interrogations,
given the objective nature of the test to be applied, it is
typically less important than in other contexts The
necessary facts regarding the site, length, and focus of the
interrogation and the indicia of arrest are facts that
generally can be adequately reflected in a cold record.
Similarly, facts that show that a police officer's statement
or act is one that the officer should have known would
likely elicit an incriminating response generally can be
identified with specificity and written into the record
Thus, this second factor of the balancing test does not
weigh in favor of granting greater discretion to the trial
court.
[*P41] Third, and lastly, we consider whether
policy considerations favor more or less appellate control
over the factual application of the concept of custodial
interrogation 57 Because the custodial interrogation
inquiry is the crux of the test that determines when a
suspect's Fifth Amendment right must be protected
through a Miranda warning, there is a strong [***37]
interest in promoting clarity and consistency in our state's
jurisprudence Clarity and consistency in our courts'
application of the Miranda protections will benefit the
accused by
offering
predictable
constitutional
protections, and it will benefit the State by providing
better guidance to the police officers in their
administration of Miranda warnings Thus, the third
factor in our balancing test weighs strongly in favor of
nondeferential review.
57 State v Virgin, 2006 UT 29, P28, 137 P 3d
787 (citing Pena, 869 P 2d at 938-39).
[*P42] Our application of the balancing test leads
us to conclude that nondeferential appellate review of
custodial interrogation determinations is mandated.
Specifically, we hold that the first two factors of the
balancing test do not favor deferential review because the
facts involved m a custodial interrogation determination
are usually relatively simple, and the custodial
interrogation determination does not typically rely
heavily on credibility [***38] determinations or other
subtle factual determinations that are the prerogative of
the trial court. Moreover, even if the application of these
factors made a stronger case for deferential appellate
review, they would be outweighed by the need for
uniformity in the custodial interrogation standard.

[*P43] Our reasoning on these points is consistent
with that from our recent decision in State v Brake. 58 In
Brake, we decided that we would review for correctness
mixed questions of fact and law in the context of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure cases.59 We grounded this
decision in the substantial constitutional issues at stake,
determining that the variety of fact patterns in those
search
[**1108]
and seizure cases was not
unmanageable and did not outweigh the need for uniform
legal rules. m We concluded that, in the context of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure cases, the need for a
consistent body of case law that would set statewide
standards demanded that we review each of these
determinations for correctness.61
58 2004 UT95, PP14-15, 103 P 3d 699.
59 Id
60 Id
61 Id, see also State v Hansen, 2002 UT 125,
P25, 63 P 3d 650, State v Warren, 2003 UT 36,
PI 2, 78 P 3d 590.
[*P44] Like the law governing Fourth Amendment
protections, custodial interrogation determinations define
the boundaries of a substantial constitutional right—the
Fifth Amendment right to avoid self mcnmination--and
should be defined and applied uniformly for the benefit
of the State as well as for the benefit of the criminal
suspect As in Brake, these concerns outweigh
countervailing factors and require nondeferential review
of this mixed question of fact and law Indeed, the facts
that we consider in the context of a Fifth Amendment
custodial interrogation determination are generally
simpler and more manageable than the facts that go into
determining search and seizure issues under the Fourth
Amendment.
[*P45] Finally, we note that although we have not
previously applied an express balancing analysis to the
mixed question of custodial interrogation, our
announcement of a correctness standard of review for
[***40]
custodial interrogation determinations is
consistent with our prior precedent Since we directly
addressed standards of review for mixed questions in
Pena, this court has discussed the standard of review for
the mixed question of custodial interrogation in only one
case, State v Wood.62 In Wood, we stated that when facts
are undisputed we review custodial determinations for
correctness. 63 While our correctness standard does
conflict with the deferential standard applied in some of
our court of appeals' cases, M that court has never
expressly considered the policy implications discussed in
Brake or conducted a full balancing analysis using the

undisputed facts of the case gave rise to a presumption of the
reasonableness of his actions under the defense of habitation
statute and that the State had failed to rebut that presumption.
The district court again denied Patrick's motion, stating that
"it would be improper for the court to take this out of the
jury's hands because there is some evidence [of guilt]" and the
amount of evidence required to defeat a directed verdict motion
"is very minimal."

[Last day transcript 137:19-22]

Both sides proceeded to make their closing arguments, each
of which addressed the factors that, if established, would give
rise to a presumption of reasonableness of Patrick's actions
under the defense of habitation statute.

In addressing whether

Scott's entry into Patrick's home was unlawful, one of the
factors that would create a presumption, the State asserted that
Scott's entry could not be deemed unlawful if his initial entry
was permissive even if Scott subsequently ignored Kay and
Patrick's demands that he leave.

As characterized by the State,

" [a]n unlawful entry is unlawful at the time he crosses the
threshold."

At this point in the State's closing, Patrick

objected, stating as the grounds for his objection merely that
the State had made a "misstatement of the law."

Patrick did not

offer any argument as to what the misstatement of lav/ might be,
nor did he raise any objection that the State was misrepresenting
the facts in evidence.
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factors that we discussed in Pena and its progeny. In
sum, our application of the balancing test to the mixed
question of custodial interrogation, particularly in light of
the policy favoring uniformity in the application of Fifth
Amendment Miranda protections, leads us to conclude
that we should apply a correctness standard for such
questions.
62 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993).
63 Id. at 83.
r***4;u
64 See State v. Teuscher, 883 P. 2d 922, 929
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (determining that a trial
court's custody determination should be granted
some deference because the inquiry is factsensitive); see also State v. Riggs, 1999 UT App
271, P7, 987 P.2d 1281 (granting a measure of
discretion to trial court's custodial interrogation
determination); State v. Straus berg, 895 P. 2d
831, 834 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (granting a
measure of discretion to trial court's custody
determination "unless such determination exceeds
established legal boundaries"). But see State v.
Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(reviewing for correctness whether, given the
underlying facts, defendant "was in custody for

Miranda purposes").
CONCLUSION
[*P46] We hold that custodial interrogation
determinations should be reviewed for correctness. We
arrive at this conclusion by applying a revised threefactor balancing test that is based on the factors and
policy considerations discussed in State v. Pena and its
progeny. First, the [***42] facts attendant to custodial
interrogation determinations are generally not so
complex and varied as to preclude the articulation of a
rule. Second, credibility determinations generally do not
weigh heavily in such determinations. And third, there is
a strong policy interest in establishing predictable
standards to guide both the courts and police officers in
their administration of Fifth Amendment Miranda
protections. Having answered the question that is before
us on certiorari, we remand to the court of appeals with
directions to apply a correctness standard to the trial
court's determination that Levin was not subjected to
custodial interrogation and for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
[**1109] [*P47] Chief Justice Durham, Associate
Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish, and Justice
Nehring concur in Justice Durrant's opinion.

Patrick was charged with murder and bound over for trial.
Both sides filed pre-trial motions regarding character evidence,
with the State seeking to admit prior acts by Patrick and Patrick
seeking to admit prior acts by Scott.

In a written ruling issued

on May 26, 2005, the district court allowed the State to present
evidence of Patrick's prior acts involving Kay, Scott, and Cindy,
ruling that "the issue is not whether these facts are to show a
propensity to commit the offense, but relate to his self defense
issue, which by its nature raises the issue of peacefulness and
reasonableness of [Patrick's] conduct."

The district court

denied Patrick's request to admit evidence of Scott's two prior
felony sex offenses, but allowed Patrick to present evidence of
Scottfs prior acts to the extent those acts might relate to
Patrick's state of mind at the time of the shooting.

At the close of the State's case-in-chief, which relied
primarily on Kay's testimony about the shooting, Patrick moved
for a directed verdict on his claim of self-defense.

Patrick's

motion asserted that the State had failed in its burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Patrick had not acted in selfdefense.

The district court denied Patrick's motion.

At the close of all of the evidence, Patrick again made a
motion for a directed verdict asserting a failure by the State to
disprove self-defense.
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